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Abstract
Newly emerging ad hoc networking technology has enormous potential beneﬁt for many mission-
critical applications. However, providing adequate security required for the target applications
presents many new challenges due to the unique nature of ad hoc environments. Complete de-
centralization and the absence of any support infrastructure in ad hoc environments eﬀectively
eliminates the possibility of the direct application of known security service designs from wired net-
works and infrastructure-based wireless networks. In this thesis, we investigate the environmental
challenges posed by ad hoc environments and their eﬀects on security service designs. Interac-
tions between environmental factors, network properties and the quality of the security service are
captured in a newly proposed concept called the Situation. Based on the understanding of situa-
tions, we provide design guidelines for Situation-Aware Security services where a security service is
viewed as a best-eﬀort service whose quality must be continuously monitored and quantiﬁed. The
measurement of the varying quality of a security service is then conveyed to the end users to aid
their decisions on appropriate usage of the provided security service. Based on this situation-aware
security paradigm, we present two types of security services, security-aware routing for quantiﬁ-
ably secure route discovery and situation-aware key management that provides end users with the
best-achievable authentication service with intuitive metrics to measure the provided quality of
authentication.
iv
Acknowledgments
There are numerous people that I should thank for helping me through the graduate program. First
and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor Professor Robin Kravets for her continuing guidance
and support. She was always available when I needed any kind of help and her constant endeavor
for excellence has been a tremendous driving force for this work. I also thank the members of my
committee, Professors Roy Campbell, Professor Klara Nahrstedt, and Professor Nitin Vaidya for
their helpful comments and insights that made this thesis much deeper and broader. Professor
Campbell deserves special thanks for his support and guidance during the ﬁrst half of my graduate
career. I’d also like to thank Professor Geneva Belford. She was my academic advisor when I ﬁrst
started in the graduate program and has been a constant support ever since. Anda Ohlsson was
always there to help me navigate through the maze of departmental rules and regulations. Her help
was invaluable.
Even though I often complained that I have not met enough good friends during my stay in
Champaign, I now realize that it was simply not true. There are many people I am privileged to
know. First, I would like thank my oﬃcemates in Mobius group, Albert Harris, Luiz Magalhaes,
Cigdem Sengul, Yaling Yang, Robin Snader and Prashant Ratanchandani for countless interesting
discussions and for attending countless practice talks and reading through numerous paper drafts
without a complaint. I only wish that I was able to return the favor. I started my journey through
the graduate program with three very good friends from System Software Research Group, Prasad
Naldurg, Apu Kapadia, and Jalal Al-Muhtadi. We literally grew up together through many phases
of the graduate school and I am glad that I had companions like you. I thank you all for being good
friends. Outside of school, I owe a large part of my sanity to three years of Bushidokan training
under my two wonderful senseis Albert and Erin Harris. I hope I could have a chance to repay the
debt someday.
v
Last but not least, I’d like to thank my family; my parents for educating me with aspects from
arts and sciences, for providing me the opportunity to pursue my dreams. My in-laws for uncon-
ditional support and encouragement to pursue my interests. Finally, I owe my deepest gratitude
to my wife Aeri for for believing in me and for her everlasting love and support during this long
journey.
vi
Table of Contents
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
List of Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
Chapter 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter 2 Situation-Aware Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1 Security as a Spectrum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Environmental Factors in Ad Hoc Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Capturing Environmental Impacts with the Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4 Related Research to Situation-Aware Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4.1 Security for Ad Hoc Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4.2 Measuring the Quality of Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Chapter 3 Security-Aware Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1.1 Example Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.1.2 Untrusted Transit Network: The Hidden Assumption in Ad Hoc Routing . . 21
3.2 Security-Aware ad hoc Routing (SAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.2.1 Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2.2 Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2.3 Protocol Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.3 Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.3.1 Trust levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.3.2 Information in Transit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.4 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.4.1 Changes to RREQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.4.2 Changes to RREP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.4.3 SAODV Route Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.5 Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.5.1 Simulation Set-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.5.2 SAODV Processing Overheads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.5.3 Secure Routing Measurements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.6 Summary of Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
vii
Chapter 4 Situation-Aware Key Management for Ad Hoc Networks . . . . . . . 38
4.1 Key Management in Ad Hoc Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.1.1 Three Goals for Ad Hoc Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.1.2 Two Principles for Ad Hoc Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.1.3 Certiﬁcate Chaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.1.4 Distributed CA Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.2 Situation-Aware Key Management Frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.2.1 Modeling Trust Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.2.2 Metrics of Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Chapter 5 MOCA: A Secure Distributed PKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.1 MOCA Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.2 MOCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.2.1 Using Threshold Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.2.2 Message Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.3 Manycast Communication Support for the Certiﬁcation Traﬃc . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.4 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.4.1 Threshold Cryptography Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.4.2 Measuring the Security Level for Distributed CAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.4.3 Selection of MOCA nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.4.4 Degradation of Threshold Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.5 Communication Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.5.1 Simulation Set-Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.5.2 Success Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.5.3 Packet Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.6 Summary of Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Chapter 6 Composite Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
6.1 Composite Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
6.2 Design of Composite Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
6.2.1 Node Types in a Composite Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
6.2.2 Composition Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
6.3 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
6.3.1 Composing a Distributed CA with Certiﬁcate Chaining . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
6.3.2 Composing Certiﬁcate Chaining with a TTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
6.4 Summary of Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Chapter 7 Quality of Authentication of Ad Hoc Key Management Frameworks 96
7.1 Evaluation Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
7.1.1 Quality of Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
7.1.2 Success Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
7.1.3 Normalized QoA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
7.2 Experiment Set-Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
7.3 Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
7.3.1 Distributed PKI Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
7.3.2 Certiﬁcate Chaining Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
7.3.3 Hybrid Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
7.4 Summary of Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
viii
7.5 Summary of Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Chapter 8 Conclusions and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Vita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
ix
List of Tables
3.1 Overall Simulation Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.2 Number of Routes Discovered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.3 Routing Message Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.4 Overall Simulation Time and Transmitted Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.5 Route Optimality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.6 Routing Message Overheads for Secure Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.7 Overall Simulation Time and Transmitted Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.1 Simulation Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
6.1 Simulation Parameters for ns-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
6.2 Communication Overhead for Composite Approach, k=15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
7.1 Simulation Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
x
List of Figures
2.1 Two Views on Understanding Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Dependency Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1 Security-aware Routing - Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.2 Situation for Security-aware Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.1 Situation Diagram for Certiﬁcate Chaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.2 Situation for Ad Hoc PKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.3 Comparison of Existing Ad Hoc PKIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.4 Situation-Aware Key Management Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.5 A Simple Trust Relationship Graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.6 Trust Relationship Graph of a Certiﬁcate Chaining System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.7 Trust Relationship Graph of a PKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.8 Combining Multiple Opinions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.1 Example Ad Hoc Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.2 Ideal Manycast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.3 Security Level with Varying Number of MOCA Nodes n (it k=10) . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.4 Security Level with Varying the Attacker Capacity c (k=10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.5 Success Ratio in the 1000m x 1000m Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.6 Success Ratio in the 2000m x 2000m Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.7 Packet Overhead in the 1000m x 1000m Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.8 Packet Overhead in the 2000m x 2000m Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.9 Comparison between MOCA and Existing Ad Hoc PKIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
6.1 Situation for Composite Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
6.2 Certiﬁcation Graph for Typical CA Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
6.3 Certiﬁcation Graph for Certiﬁcate Chaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
6.4 Certiﬁcation Graph for Typical Composite Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
6.5 Distributed CA composed with 1-hop Certiﬁcate Chaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.6 Certiﬁcate Chaining composed with CA-certiﬁed Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.7 Success Ratio vs. Mobility, k = 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
6.8 Success Ratio vs. Crypto Threshold k, max speed = 20 m/s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
6.9 Success Ratio vs. Fraction of Certiﬁed Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6.10 Average Conﬁdence Value vs. Fraction of Certiﬁed Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6.11 Path Lengths, with varying fraction of certiﬁed nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
6.12 Success Ratio vs. Mobility, with 30% of certiﬁed nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
6.13 Average Conﬁdence Value vs. Mobility, with 30% of certiﬁed nodes . . . . . . . . . . 93
xi
6.14 Varying Limit on Chain Length, 30% certiﬁed nodes, 10 m/s max. speed . . . . . . 93
6.15 Varying Avg. Conﬁdence Value, 30% certiﬁed nodes, 10 m/s max. speed . . . . . . . 94
6.16 Performance Comparison of Composite Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
7.1 CA Security Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
7.2 Kong’s Distributed PKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
7.3 MOCA Distributed PKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
7.4 Certiﬁcate Chaining with Global Trust Relationship Graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
7.5 Distributed Certiﬁcate Chaining by Capkun et al. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
7.6 Composite Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
7.7 Performance Summary of Ad Hoc Key Management Frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . 107
xii
List of Abbreviations
CA Certiﬁcate Authority
CCV Chain Conﬁdence Value
MoA Metrics of Authentication
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
QoA Quality of Authentication
xiii
Chapter 1
Introduction
Mobile ad hoc networking has emerged as an enabling technology to provide network support for
challenging environments where providing network connectivity was previously infeasible or ﬁnan-
cially unjustiﬁed. Numerous situations, including battleﬁeld communication support, emergency
rescue operations, instant oﬃce meetings, school ﬁeld trips, and city-wide wireless network connec-
tivity via mesh networks, can readily and enormously beneﬁt from ad hoc networking technology.
Without relying on any stationary infrastructure, an ad hoc network is composed solely of mo-
bile nodes communicating with one another using a wireless medium. An ad hoc network is a
community-based and egalitarian way to create an instant network with two distinctive advantages
in deployment over the traditional alternatives: timeliness and low cost. Since an ad hoc network
does not require deployment of any heavy communication infrastructure, it can be deployed more
quickly than wired or infrastructure-based wireless networks. Additionally, since an ad hoc network
is formed among the mobile nodes at the scene instead of adding any additional communication
infrastructure, deployment of an ad hoc network does not incur any extra hardware cost. However,
the very characteristics that enable these advantages can act as a double-edged sword for providing
the necessary security support, which is implicitly required by many applications served by ad hoc
networks including battleﬁeld communication and emergency rescue support. Security can easily
be the single biggest obstacle to be solved before an ad hoc network can be deployed in reality.
Since its emergence in the early 90’s, ad hoc networking has received a lot of attention from both
the research community and commercial interests. Most of the early research was focused on solving
the problem of routing packets using cooperative forwarding in this new environment [C. 99, J. ].
Challenges in lower layers of the network protocol stack, management of data inside ad hoc networks
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at the higher layers, and also cross-layer issues are some of the more recent interests of the research
community. All of these eﬀorts strive to handle the fundamental challenges of ad hoc environments
in diﬀerent layers with diﬀerent approaches. Essentially, the goal is to provide the same quality and
types of services as in traditional networks. By the same token, the goal of designing ad hoc security
services is to provide the equivalent level of security support as in wired environments. In the
context of providing security support, we recognize four environmental factors as the fundamental
obstacles to providing strong security support in ad hoc environments: (1) vulnerable mobile nodes
and heavy reliance on these insecure nodes for crucial network functions, (2) a public wireless
medium prone to eavesdropping, (3) the absence of a reliable infrastructure, and (4) dynamic
network state due to the mobility of nodes. Earlier approaches to supporting security in ad hoc
networks typically solve some of these challenges but did not provide universal solutions. Recently,
more uniﬁed approaches, including cross-layer solutions, have been proposed to solve all of these
challenges at the same time. Unfortunately, most security research for ad hoc environments is still
in its early stages where proposed solutions can only solve a part of the challenges under strong
assumptions. The main reason for this phenomenon is the lack of a deeper understanding of the
challenges. In other words, researchers have been trying to adopt known solutions from traditional
network environments in radically diﬀerent ad hoc environments without ﬁrst fully understanding
the vast diﬀerences. What is necessary is a signiﬁcant change in view or a shift of paradigm that
provides a new view of the security challenges as a whole.
Most previous eﬀorts toward ad hoc network security attempting to adopt existing solutions
from wired network environments capture only a subset of the diﬀerences while trying to provide
an equivalent level of security, resulting in solutions that usually break under slightly changed or
mildly stressful conditions. A more viable way to approach this problem is ﬁrst to clearly identify
the diﬀerences between ad hoc and traditional environments and then address these diﬀerences as
an explicit part of the design process for ad hoc security services. In other words, the hidden and
implicit assumptions that traditional security systems have relied on must be explicitly identiﬁed
and exposed in the design of an ad hoc security services. Additionally, the impact of these assump-
tions on the quality of security services must be measured and these measurements must be used
to decide the trade-oﬀ between the cost of security and the quality of security. In other words,
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security must be understood as a best-eﬀort service instead of a guaranteed service.
To this end, we propose a new approach to addressing these security challenges called Situation-
Aware Security. First, we introduce the concept of Situation, which is the overall information and
knowledge about a security service including all of its implicit assumptions. A situation for a
security service consists of two components: the design of the speciﬁc security service and the end
user’s knowledge and observations about environmental impacts that can aﬀect the vulnerability
of the security service. Give this situational information, the quality of the available service can
be measured and exposed to end users. This Situation-Aware Security paradigm is a more viable
alternative to providing practical security support in ad hoc networks. The main challenges for
providing situation-aware security include the following four points. First, an ad hoc security
service must be designed to provide the best-achievable security service and to expose the relevant
information about its design parameters at the same time. This information serves as the basis to
form a situation. Second, the relevant set of situational information, including the design parameters
and environmental eﬀects, must be identiﬁed for each ad hoc security service. (i.e., “What aﬀects
the quality of security”). Third, a concise and intuitive set of metrics must be designed to calculate
the changing levels of the quality of security (i.e., “How to measure the quality of security”). Lastly,
all of this information must be presented to end users through an intuitive interface that can be
easily understood. (i.e., “How to present the measured quality of security”).
In Chapter 2, we present the concept of situation-aware security in detail. Then, we proceed
with two types of security services designed based on the situation-aware security paradigm. In
Chapter 3, we investigate the challenge stemming from the absence of a dedicated routing infras-
tructure or a transit network. Instead of communicating through a trusted transit network, mobile
nodes in an ad hoc network communicate with one another relying on other ordinary mobile nodes.
We identify newly presented challenges in this diﬀerent environment and investigate subsequent
vulnerabilities. We present Security-Aware Routing (SAR) to provide the concept of trustworthi-
ness in ad hoc routing. In the following three chapters, we investigate the challenge of providing a
reliable and available authentication services in ad hoc networks. Many ad hoc security services,
including our own SAR, rely on other fundamental security services such as authentication. In
Chapter 4, we present the goals and design principles of ad hoc key management frameworks that
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provide authentication service and survey the existing approaches with our observations about why
these approaches have failed to address the challenges adequately. As the solution, we propose
Situation-Aware Key Management. As a part of Situation-Aware Key Management, we present an
extensive trust model and concise metrics to measure the Quality of Authentication (QoA) using
the wisdom from philosophy research called Scientiﬁc Conﬁrmation Theory. In Chapter 5, we
present the ﬁrst incarnation of situation-aware key management in the form of a distributed public
key infrastructure (PKI) design called MOCA. MOCA provides very high quality authentication
service with support for measuring the changing quality of authentication depending on the net-
work status. We further extend the design of MOCA in Chapter 6 to address the unique challenges
from an ad hoc environment and present a novel way of seamlessly combining multiple authen-
tication mechanisms called Composite Key Management. In Chapter 7, we apply the metrics for
QoA to all existing key management framework designs and present the results from an extensive
comparison study. The results from this study again demonstrate the strength and necessity of the
situation-aware security paradigm. Finally, we conclude in Chapter 8 with several future research
directions.
4
Under normal conditions the research
scientist is not an innovator but a solver of
puzzles, and the puzzles upon which he
concentrates are just those which he
believes can be both stated and solved
within the existing scientiﬁc tradition.
Thomas Kuhn
Chapter 2
Situation-Aware Security
As a technology matures, many assumptions and requirements that are initially investigated become
widely accepted across the research community and eventually they become invisible and hidden,
and eventually forgotten. This is the natural evolution of a research area and enables researchers
to focus their attention on more relevant issues and deepen their understanding based on such
abstractions. However, every so often there comes a time when all such forgotten assumptions need
to be reexamined due to radical changes in environments or signiﬁcant new ﬁndings that alter the
accepted view. We have observed a good example of such a situation with the advent of wireless
networking. During the last three decades, the main thrust of networking research has been the
Internet. After two decades of research, networking technology for wired networks was mature
when wireless technology started showing up. However, much of the wisdom learned through
Internet research eﬀorts could not be directly applied to the new wireless environments because
this new environment violated some of the key assumptions that were made and subsequently
forgotten for the wired network. Perhaps the best example is the use of TCP (Transmission Control
Protocol) in wireless networks [BSAK95, HV02, LK00, MCG+01]. TCP was designed upon a very
strong assumption that a packet loss is only caused by congestion inside the network [Pos81].
Therefore, a packet loss causes the TCP sender to back oﬀ and reduce its load on the network,
alleviating congestion. While this assumption is indeed strong, it holds true in wired networks such
as the Internet and served well in the reﬁnement of TCP. Even though TCP has been studied and
enhanced extensively over the years, it did not work as expected when ﬁrst adopted to wireless
environments. The culprit was the fact that the wireless environments introduced another cause
for the packet loss: wireless channel errors. This seemingly unimportant diﬀerence in the new
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environment practically broke the well-reﬁned TCP in wireless networks, resulting in very poor
performance results. Once this problem was recognized, many variations of TCP were proposed,
most of which try to distinguish between congestion losses and channel losses. In other words,
TCP had a hidden assumption that did not hold anymore in the new environment and exposing
the hidden assumption was necessary for TCP to work in a wireless setting.
Similar observations can be made about providing security support for ad hoc environments.
Security research in wired networks and infrastructure-based wireless networks such as cellular
networks have been well investigated over the years. However, newly emerging ad hoc environments
present challenges that require us to re-examine many of the forgotten assumptions that were
irrelevant in previous settings. For example, wired/cellular network environments enjoy a set of
luxuries that do not exist in ad hoc networks, such as reliable connectivity, stable network routes,
and availability of secure and reliable servers. Naturally, most security systems designed for wired
networks are designed to maximize the bounty of these facilities. As a result, many existing security
service designs rely heavily on the availability of a secure and fault-tolerant trusted third party and
stable connectivity to it. As ad hoc networks became more popular, many researchers attempted to
adopt solutions from the Internet into ad hoc environments without examining the potential hidden
assumptions. Essentially, they tried to address the challenges in ad hoc environments without ﬁrst
clearly identifying them, resulting in incomplete or ineﬀective designs. As a result, these systems
often break under conditions that are slightly diﬀerent or more stressful than what they were
designed for. Furthermore, since these assumptions were deeply integrated into the design of the
solutions, it is unclear when they will break and why they do. A better approach would be ﬁrst to
identify and recognize the impacts of ad hoc environments on security services and then to design
security services with clearly stated assumptions or dependencies on the environment. In other
words, the hidden assumptions of existing security service designs must be exposed. Furthermore,
simply recognizing the diﬀerence is not enough because of the unstable and volatile nature of
dynamic ad hoc environments. We argue that the eﬀects of these hidden assumptions must be
quantiﬁed because the eﬀects can be signiﬁcant and change rapidly. Therefore, the eﬀects of
environmental factors on the hidden assumptions must be constantly monitored and conveyed to
end users.
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2.1 Security as a Spectrum
Traditionally, we are accustomed to thinking of security as an absolute concept or a guaranteed
service. In other words, the main design goal of security services has been to provide a perfect level
of security. For example, a ﬁrewall is designed to block all unauthorized accesses and not some
portion of them. Likewise, an encryption algorithm is expected to generate truly random-looking
ciphertext and not somewhat random output. However, realizing this seemingly natural goal is
not a trivial matter. Moreover, in ad hoc environments where network conditions can change very
rapidly, it is almost impossible to design a security service that is immune to all environmental
eﬀects of ad hoc networks.
Insecure
No Security
Secure
Perfect
Security No Security
Varying Quality of Security
Security
Perfect
(a) Traditional View on Security (b) Situation-Aware Security
Figure 2.1: Two Views on Understanding Security
If we visualize the quality of a security service as a continuous spectrum with no security at
one end and perfect security at the other end, the traditional view is to consider the single ex-
treme point of perfect security, or a very narrow margin around that single point, as acceptable
(Figure 2.1 (a)). Designing a security service to achieve this strict goal in any complex system may
be possible in theory, but almost impossible in reality due to bugs, excessive costs, environmental
diﬃculties, or the diﬃculty in managing the sheer complexity of the system. There have recently
been attempts to address these problems by designing systems to expect and tolerate minor mal-
functions or intrusions [CLR+02, PBB+02]. We believe this is the right direction to approaching
security challenges in any complex system.
However, in ad hoc environments, it is almost impossible to maintain a security service to
provide even almost perfect security due to the challenging environmental conditions. Therefore,
we propose to extend the previous view of tolerating minor imperfections even further to the
point where a security service is considered as a best-eﬀort service with changing quality over
time (Figure 2.1 (b)). Instead of treating faults and compromises as rare exceptions to handle,
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they must be viewed as a part of the normal operating conditions that aﬀect the provided level of
service. Instead of trying to design a perfect security service in ad hoc networks, which is likely to
be infeasible or too expensive to maintain, a security service can be designed to provide the best-
achievable service under varying conditions. The consequences of this change in view forces end
users of such services to change their perception of security from an absolute binary concept with
only two states {secure, insecure} to a service with continuous levels. Therefore, end users of such
security services must be equipped with the facility to measure the quality of the provided service.
Based on such measurements, end users can make well-informed decisions whether to utilize the
security service at its current level or to wait until a higher level of service becomes available, or
even employ additional means to improve upon currently available security services.
Environmental factors in ad hoc networks that aﬀect the quality of available security can ﬂuc-
tuate rapidly and to a signiﬁcant extent. Since the level of an available security service can also
change rapidly as a result, the measurement of quality of security must also be performed frequently.
In the remainder of this chapter, we ﬁrst discuss the unique environmental challenges in ad hoc
networks that impact security services in the following section. Then, we propose the concept of
Situation that captures all relevant environmental factors for a given security service. We conclude
this chapter with a survey of research eﬀorts related to the situation-aware security paradigm.
2.2 Environmental Factors in Ad Hoc Networks
The unique infrastructure-free nature of ad hoc networks results in several distinct characteristics
that are not found in traditional networks and we identify four such factors that can aﬀect security
services.
First, all nodes in an ad hoc network are assumed to be mobile end users. Therefore, the physical
security of each node is seriously degraded since it is much easier to compromise a mobile node that
is prone to capture. Moreover, due to the absence of any support infrastructure, all critical network
functions must be performed collectively within the network. The most obvious example of this
is found in the design of ad hoc routing protocols [J. , R. 97, Y. 98, V. 97, C. 99, E. 99, C-K97] .
Unlike wired networks where a small number of service providers “own” the transit network, an
ad hoc network is collectively owned by the mobile nodes that form the network. Therefore, the
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network infrastructure can no longer be implicitly trusted as it is in the Internet.
Second, all communication in an ad hoc network uses a wireless medium, which is inherently
shared, and controlling access to the wireless medium is not simple. The best showcase of this is
the jamming [XTZW05] attack. Jamming is an attack at the physical layer where a malicious node
can emit powerful signals that overshadow all meaningful and legitimate communication in an area.
Unless access to the physical area can be controlled, jamming cannot be defeated. Therefore, any
service for ad hoc environments must be designed to handle such network connectivity disruptions.
A less severe case of an attack against the wireless medium is eavesdropping where any node with a
wireless receiver can capture the communication traﬃc. Therefore, an additional level of protection
is required for sensitive data traﬃc required for an ad hoc security service.
Third, by deﬁnition, an ad hoc network does not rely on a special-purpose communication in-
frastructure, such as routers in the Internet or base stations in cellular networks. This causes
problems in attempts to reuse existing approaches for wired network security in ad hoc net-
works [SMGLA96, SNS88]. Most security solutions designed for wired networks assume that it
is possible to maintain secure and reliable servers against malicious attacks and random faults alto-
gether. For example, PKI [KP] for wired networks is designed to rely on secure hosts that serve as
the certiﬁcate authority. However, the same design cannot be applied to ad hoc environments due
to the inherent physical vulnerability of mobile nodes. Therefore, the design of an ad hoc security
service must be approached in a diﬀerent way by relying on the collective provision of security
services.
Finally, network connectivity can change rapidly in ad hoc networks due to the mobility of
nodes. Existing security solutions for wired networks typically assume that the network is almost
always fully connected [SNS88]. That is, any node in a network can expect to communicate with
any other node without disruption. However, network connectivity in ad hoc networks is a function
of mobility and cannot be guaranteed unless the mobility of nodes is controlled. For example, a
popular way to authenticate a mobile user in a wireless LAN environment is “Wi-Fi Protected
Access (WPA)”, which relies on a back-end authentication server [All]. In WPA, a mobile node
is presented with a challenge and its response is veriﬁed by the authentication server located
inside the network. The connectivity to this authentication server must be guaranteed. Otherwise,
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Figure 2.2: Dependency Relationships
mobile users can be randomly denied network access. This approach cannot be adopted in ad hoc
environments since it is not possible to guarantee connectivity to any certain node at any given
time. In summary, an ad hoc security service must be designed without any strong assumptions
about stable network connectivity.
These four unique challenges in ad hoc environments aﬀect the performance of security services,
typically degrading the quality of service provided by them. To capture these service-speciﬁc eﬀects
of environmental factors, we next deﬁne a new concept of Situation.
2.3 Capturing Environmental Impacts with the Situation
The eﬀects of environmental factors on security services are speciﬁc to the design of each service and
the assumptions it makes. We capture these service-speciﬁc environmental eﬀects in the concept
of Situation. A situation is a set of hidden assumptions that a speciﬁc security service relies on
and environmental factors that can aﬀect such hidden assumptions. The relationships between the
hidden assumptions and environmental factors can be captured by mapping the security services,
network properties and environmental factors using a graph structure. In Figure 2.2, the square
objects in the right column represent diﬀerent security services. These services each rely on certain
network properties to operate. The network properties are represented as the circular objects in the
middle column. Edges from a service object to a network property indicate that the service relies on
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the speciﬁc network property. In the left column, triangles represent the environmental factors that
exist in ad hoc networks, including the ones discussed in Section 2.2. Each of these environmental
factors aﬀect a set of network properties, typically resulting in the ﬂuctuation of the properties, as
denoted by the edges from the environmental factors to the network properties. Given a service,
service 1, at the top of the right column, we can easily identify the network properties this service
relies on and, in turn, the environmental eﬀects that can degrade these network properties. We
deﬁne the concept that includes all of these players as the situation, which is essentially the set of
environmental factors that can degrade the network properties required by a speciﬁc service.
In traditional wired network environments, the eﬀects of environmental factors are negligible.
Therefore, there was no need to expose the interactions between the environmental factors and the
relevant network properties for a wired security service. In comparison, in ad hoc environments, the
impacts of environmental factors in the left column can be signiﬁcant and also frequently changing,
resulting in rapid ﬂuctuation of the quality of security provided by security services. Hence, we
argue for two points. First, all hidden and forgotten assumptions need to be made explicit and
the degradation of each assumption must be clearly understood. Second, since the environmental
factors in ad hoc environments can change frequently, the eﬀects of the changing network properties
are also frequent and signiﬁcant, resulting in potentially severe ﬂuctuations in the achievable level
of security by the services. Therefore, monitoring must be constantly provided and measurements
must be continuously provided to end users.
However, it is not wise to provide end users with the raw information about environmental
eﬀects on a speciﬁc security service. The information must be processed and tailored so that an
end user can intuitively understand and act upon the information. In situation-aware security, the
situational information is translated into the form of the Quality of Security before being conveyed
to the end users. End users do not need to know the detailed situational interactions of a security
service but only the changing quality of security resulting from such interactions. When an ad hoc
security service is immune to any environmental eﬀects, end users will get a perception of perfect
quality of security. If environmental factors aﬀect the security service, such a situation is translated
into degraded quality of security. The speciﬁc meaning of quality of security is dependent on each
security service and we will address two speciﬁc deﬁnitions for routing and for key management. In
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the rest of this chapter, we examine related research eﬀorts that share certain characteristics with
the situation-aware security paradigm.
2.4 Related Research to Situation-Aware Security
We can categorize the related research for situation-aware security into two classes. First, there
are various types of security services proposed for ad hoc environments. Most of these approaches
implicitly include some notion of the situation concept in their design [CBH03, K. 02]. Most security
services are designed based on a set of assumptions about relevant environmental factors and their
impacts. However, none of the current approaches provide the monitoring functionality for the
quality of the provided security service that is necessary to provide complete situation-awareness.
Instead, they are designed to provide the intended high quality of security within a certain range
of assumptions and fail when these assumptions are violated, resulting in silent failures. Since
the network dynamics of an ad hoc environments can ﬂuctuate signiﬁcantly, designing an ad hoc
security service that does not fail is either technically infeasible or prohibitively expensive, limiting
the utility of these approaches. The second category of related research exists in various eﬀorts
to quantify or measure the quality of security. However, most previous research focuses on the
trade-oﬀ between the cost and the quality of security in the interest of reducing costs when it is
possible to provide near-perfect quality of security [Chu02, ONY03]. Although it may be possible
to provide very good quality of security, some applications may not require such high levels of
security. In such cases, it is desirable to reduce the quality of security to save the related costs
while maintaining the required level of security. In other words, the quality of security is used
to pinpoint the best trade-oﬀ point, not to provide changing information to end users in these
research eﬀorts. In comparison, we deal with ad hoc environments where providing a high level of
security itself is challenging and the goal of situation-aware security is to accurately measure the
best-achievable quality of security available from the security service under challenging network
conditions. We discuss both categories of research eﬀorts in detail in the remainder of this chapter.
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2.4.1 Security for Ad Hoc Environments
As ad hoc networking technology receives more attention, security support for ad hoc environments
has become a critical challenge. Numerous approaches have been proposed for various types of
security services. However, none of the existing eﬀorts for ad hoc network security have been
designed following the situation-aware security paradigm. Each approach is designed based on a
set of assumptions. As long as such assumptions are satisﬁed, the approach can satisfy the intended
level of security service. However, once any of the assumptions is violated, these approaches fail
silently without providing any useful information. Considering the fact that it is extremely diﬃcult
to design an ad hoc security service that does not fail under any condition, an ad hoc security
service failing without any warning or useful information is not desirable. Situation-aware security
addresses this point by not classifying the performance of an ad hoc security service as success or
failure, but to treat it as continuous levels of service.
Secure routing and related solutions were the biggest focus of the community in the begin-
ning. Hu et al. propose several variations of secure routing protocols including a proactive ap-
proach [HJP02] and a reactive approach [HPJ02], each with a certain set of assumptions, such
as support of public key cryptography and no denial of service attacks. However, since these ap-
proaches do not tolerate violations of the assumptions, when these assumptions fail, both of these
approaches fail. In other words, these approaches may not work within the current situation of
the network. As a ﬁrst step in the direction of the situation-aware security Dahill et al. suggest
classifying ad hoc networks into four categories using two criteria: open vs. managed and friendly
vs. hostile [K. 02]. However, they do not provide any measurement capability in their secure rout-
ing protocol called ARAN. Therefore, ARAN also silently fails when the assumptions of the design
are violated. Capkun et al. propose another version of secure routing that does not rely on any
strong key management support [CH03] based on a diﬀerent set of assumptions without relying
on public key cryptography. Some novel attacks on ad hoc routing protocols are also discovered
and discussed. Hu et al. ﬁrst propose a new type of attack called “rushing attacks” on ad hoc
routing protocols and propose the Packet Leash protocol to prevent such attacks [HPJ03a] under
the assumption that the verifying node either has geographical information or clocks on mobile
nodes are loosely synchronized. While all of these secure routing protocols can ensure the correct
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behavior of the routing protocols under the respective assumptions, none of them is equipped with
the capability to monitor the behavior of the protocols or to detect the violation of the correct be-
havior. Essentially, they can satisfy the goals as long as their assumptions hold but do not provide
any guarantees once the assumptions are violated. Furthermore, if the assumptions fail, there is no
means to measure what kind of impact such failure causes.
Related to secure routing research is the incentive system for mobile nodes. Packets in ad
hoc networks are forwarded by intermediate mobile nodes whose interests do not necessarily lie in
helping each other. Several approaches have been proposed to give proper incentives to “selﬁsh”
mobile nodes so that enough participation can be “incentivized”. Marti et al. present the ﬁrst
attempt where each mobile node is equipped with the ability to detect their neighboring nodes’
behavior and penalize selﬁsh nodes [S. 00] assuming that mobile nodes are capable of promiscuous
eavesdropping. Buchegger et al. propose the CONFIDANT protocol that enforces fair cooperation
among mobile nodes in an ad hoc network [BB02]. Buttyan et al. propose a virtual currency
based scheme for packet forwarding where forwarding nodes get paid for their labor based on the
assumption that mobile nodes are equipped with tamper-proof hardware [BH03]. Again, all of these
approaches will function correctly as long as their respective assumptions are satisﬁed. However,
it is unclear how their utility will degrade once the assumptions are violated.
Cryptographic key management also has received a fair amount of attention from the research
community [CBH03, CHB03, HBC01, KZL+01, YK03, ZH99]. However, previous research shows
similar traits to the other areas. They are all designed to function eﬀectively under a certain set
of reasonable assumptions. However, it is unclear what constitutes a reasonable assumption in ad
hoc environments and none of the proposed designs deal with situations when their assumptions
are violated. We will discuss these issues for key management in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6
where we present our situation-aware key management frameworks.
2.4.2 Measuring the Quality of Security
The main purpose of current eﬀorts to deﬁne and measure the quality of security services under
various conditions. The main purpose of these eﬀorts is to ﬁnd the right trade-oﬀ point where good-
enough security can be provided in a cost-eﬀective way. In other words, the quality of security is
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treated as a tunable parameter selected by either end users or network operators. Tunable security
is only meaningful when it is possible to have a perfect security even at a high price. Then, the goal
of tuning the security level is to reduce the cost while maintaining the necessary level of security.
While the situation-aware security paradigm also measures the quality of a security service, the
situation-aware paradigm diﬀers in one critical aspect. The primary reason for monitoring and
measuring the quality of security service in situation-aware security is not to tune the quality of
the service but to accurately measure rapidly the changing quality of the best-achievable security
under the challenging network conditions and convey the measurements to end users for their
beneﬁt. This diﬀerence is based on the fact that end users have little or no control over an ad
hoc network. Therefore, end users cannot tune many parameters but instead must adapt to the
currently available levels of service.
Liu et al. proposed a metric called “Quality of Protection” that quantiﬁes the level of protection
for critical operating system services in active network environments [CLM+99]. Ong et al. also
used the term “Quality of Protection” to quantify the level of protection for multimedia data
depending on the types of devices, users and requirements for data traﬃc [ONY03]. Chu performed
an interesting study in his master’s thesis where he designed a framework to turn oﬀ some of the
security services in trusted operating systems for improved performance [Chu02]. In his thesis, Chu
suggested that not all applications require the strong security support available from the underlying
trusted operating system and that some applications can beneﬁt from turning oﬀ unnecessary
security support to achieve better performance. Chu observed that there is a trade-oﬀ between
the level of security and the performance of applications. Ong and Chu’s schemes share the notion
that the quality for security and the required cost should be a tunable parameter that end users
or applications can change. A similar trade-oﬀ observation is made in Lindskog’s work where
he treated the level of encryption as the tunable parameter where the grade of encryption can
be decreased to achieve better performance in resource-constrained devices [LSHJ04]. Lindskog
expanded his research to general security and the results presented in his PhD thesis [Lin05] are
perhaps the closest result to this thesis in a sense that he also views the security as a continuous
spectrum and not a binary state and tries to measure the amount of security achievable. While
Lindskog’s approach focuses on the eﬀect of resource-constrained devices, situation-aware security
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can address all possible network conditions including the eﬀects of resource-constrained devices.
In the next chapter, we introduce the ﬁrst application of the situation-aware security paradigm
to ad hoc routing, the Security-Aware Routing (SAR). Instead of blindly treating the intermedi-
ate nodes as a trustworthy transit network, SAR quantiﬁes the amount of trust provided by a
network route based on the trustworthiness of participating nodes and their capability to handle
sensitive security operations. SAR enables end users to discover trustworthy routes that can be
used to transmit sensitive traﬃc. Many ad hoc security services such as SAR require a reliable and
secure authentication service to function. Next, we apply the situation-aware security paradigm
to key management services. A well-established way to provide authentication service in dynamic
environments is to deploy a cryptographic key management framework. In Chapter 4, we lay out
the groundwork for our approach to situation-aware key management frameworks, followed by the
MOCA distributed PKI framework in Chapter 5 and Composite Key Management in Chapter 6.
In Chapter 7, we present an extensive comparison study of existing ad hoc key management frame-
works and expose newly discovered design ﬂaws stemming from the lack of situation-awareness in
their designs.
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Chapter 3
Security-Aware Routing
Most ad hoc routing protocols are cooperative by nature, depending on neighboring nodes for
packet forwarding [E. 99]. While such cooperative packet forwarding appears to be a natural
solution in ad hoc environments, it relies on one very critical hidden assumption: trust in the
transit network. In a wired network like the Internet or an infrastructure-based wireless network
like cellular networks or wireless LANs, there is implicit trust put upon the transit network between
two communicating parties since there is a clear distinction between clients and providers of the
network support. For example, Internet service providers provide the transit network for Internet
communication. Similarly, cellular carriers and hosting organizations provide the transit network
for cellular communication and wireless LAN communication. Due to this clear distinction between
the users of the network and the providers of the network, it is in the providers’ best interest to
provide a reliable service and clients can have reasonable expectation and trust in the behavior of the
transit networks. However, such assumptions do not hold anymore in ad hoc networks since there
is no separate transit network. Packets are forwarded by other mobile nodes whose main interest
is not in providing service to others. As a result, all ad hoc routing protocols become vulnerable to
malicious intermediate nodes. This na¨ıve trust model allows malicious nodes to paralyze an ad hoc
network by inserting erroneous routing updates, replaying old routing information, changing routing
updates, advertising incorrect routing information, dropping packets, and also looking inside the
packets.
While these attacks are possible in ﬁxed networks as well, the nature of the ad hoc environment
magniﬁes their eﬀects, and makes their detection diﬃcult [Y. 00b]. Secure routing solves some
of these challenges by enforcing that mobile nodes follow the protocol speciﬁcation. However, a
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secure routing protocol cannot prevent any attacks on data traﬃc, such as dropping packets and
eavesdropping, as long as the malicious nodes adhere to the behaviors speciﬁed in the protocol.
Many approaches [BH03, BB02, S. 00] have been proposed to provide incentives to forwarding
nodes so that they do not drop packets but none has been shown to provide a universal solution.
Not much attention has been paid to eavesdropping or peeking into the packets being forwarded
by the forwarding nodes since most researchers operate on the wrong assumption of a trustworthy
transit network.
This distinct absence of a trustworthy transit network in ad hoc environments demands a new
routing metric that can adequately address this new threat. Traditionally, distance (measured in
hops) is used as the metric in most ad hoc route-discovery algorithms [J. , V. 97, C. 99, Z. 97]. The
use of other metrics (e.g., geographic location, signal stability, power, load on nodes etc. [R. 97,
Y. 98, S. 98]) can improve the quality and the relevance of the routes discovered for particular
applications and conﬁgurations. Along these lines, we explore the use of diﬀerent security attributes
to improve the quality of the security of an ad hoc route. In this chapter, we present Security-Aware
ad-hoc Routing (SAR), an approach to ad hoc routing that incorporates the security levels of nodes
into traditional routing metrics. Our goal is to characterize and explicitly represent the trust values
and trust relationships associated with ad hoc nodes and use these values to make routing decisions.
SAR essentially creates virtual overlays for routing, where the characteristics of the overlays are
deﬁned by the security requirements of the application and the topology of the overlay is deﬁned
by the capabilities of the mobile nodes. We quantify the notion of trust and represent the trust
relationships explicitly by deﬁning a suitable hierarchy of trust values. Furthermore, this trust
measurements are fed back to end users so that they can have a clear idea about the quality of
routes discovered by SAR, providing situation-awareness to end users. In eﬀect, SAR enables end
users to discover secure overlays that exist in an ad hoc network.
Ensuring that data is routed through a trustworthy route composed of trusted nodes must be
accompanied with support of a secure routing protocol that can enforce the correct behavior of
SAR. SAR is an approach that provides secure and trustworthy routes for data packets and still
requires secure routing support for its control packets, which can be integrated to a SAR protocol
or based on any external secure routing approaches.
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The trust value of a node and the security attributes of a route are intimately connected in our
framework to provide a uniﬁed view of security. We introduce the notion of an integrated security
metric that is a combination of security attributes and trust levels. We augment existing ad hoc
routing algorithms with this integrated metric to steer route discovery and route maintenance
behavior. Our route discovery mechanism ﬁnds nodes that match particular security attributes
and trust levels. Only nodes that provide the required level of security can generate or propagate
route requests, updates, or replies, deﬁning the virtual overlay for secure communication. By
restricting communication to such capable nodes, SAR generates fewer routing protocol messages.
Furthermore, security policies can be encoded into the attributes to enable policy-based secure
routing.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 3.1, we present our motivation
with a representative example, expand on the characteristics of an ad hoc network that make it
vulnerable to routing attacks and brieﬂy describe a threat model. In Section 3.2, we present our
generalized SAR protocol for quantiﬁable secure route discovery, update, and propagation with
trust levels and security attributes as metrics. This section includes related research, a description
of the traditional deﬁnitions and metrics of routing protocol security, and outlines a mechanism to
quantify and measure the protection associated with particular routing protocol incarnations. In
Section 3.3, we revisit our threat model, develop an attack classiﬁcation and validate our protocol
against this model. Section 3.4 describes our experimental test bed and our modiﬁcations to AODV
to enable security-aware routing. Section 3.5 presents the performance evaluation of our prototype
in detail. Finally, Section 3.6 presents our conclusions.
3.1 Motivation
In this section, we motivate the need for security awareness in ad hoc networks at the routing level
with a battleﬁeld communication scenario along with the application of situation-awareness to the
problem.
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3.1.1 Example Scenario
To illustrate the need for network level security awareness, we present an example scenario where
ﬁnding a route with speciﬁc security attributes or trust levels is more relevant than ﬁnding the
shortest route (or any route) between two nodes. We focus on a high-risk ad hoc network, wireless
communication devices in a battleﬁeld, where malicious adversaries can intercept and alter mission
critical information.
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Figure 3.1: Security-aware Routing - Motivation
Consider the scenario where two generals establish a route to communicate among themselves,
using a generic on-demand ad hoc routing protocol(see Figure 3.1). During the mission, the gen-
erals detect that some of the privates have defected. Relaying these messages using potentially
compromised nodes can leak information to untrusted entities and jeopardize the mission. Even if
the generals encrypt the information ﬂowing between them, the fact that they are communicating
may disclose that a strike is imminent. Another threat could be that traitors may be able to store
the messages or send them to enemy nodes for cryptanalysis. Therefore, the generals decide that
they can only trust nodes owned by oﬃcers to route their packets. Security-aware routing enables
the generals to route around the problem nodes and establish an alternate route with greater secu-
rity guarantees. The sending general’s route discovery protocol embeds the rank of the node as a
metric in its negotiation and tries to establish a route that avoids all privates. If such a route exists,
as shown in the ﬁgure, a route passing through only the oﬃcers can be set up. If no route with the
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required security attributes or “quality of protection” exists, a notiﬁcation to the sender can allow
re-negotiation. Based on such feedback, for example, the generals may decide to set up a route
that can support 128-bit encryption, knowing that the privates cannot cryptanalyze or transmit
the messages very far with their inferior devices.
From this example, we observe that senders can make informed decisions about the amount
of trust that can be put upon a network route available to their data packets throughout the
route by embedding security attributes into the route discovery protocol itself. Furthermore, this
quality of protection oﬀered by the route directly aﬀects the security of the data packets exchanged
between the nodes on a particular route. Route updates and route propagation messages are also
protected by this technique. In the next subsection, we enumerate the characteristics of the ad hoc
network environment that make them vulnerable to misbehaving forwarders. To strengthen our
motivation to include security as a fundamental attribute or metric in ad hoc routing protocols,
we also present a threat model. This model enumerates the vulnerabilities and threats that expose
the communication of routing protocol packets among nodes in an ad hoc network to malicious
attackers.
3.1.2 Untrusted Transit Network: The Hidden Assumption in Ad Hoc
Routing
Ad hoc wireless routing protocols assume that the mobile nodes are cooperating with each other
to route packets from their source to their destination. Routing protocol packets carry important
control information that governs the behavior of data transmission in the ad hoc network. Without
adequate protection, these packets can be easily subverted or modiﬁed. A secure routing protocol
is required to protect control packets and an extensive amount of research has been presented on
the topic [CH03, HJP02, HPJ02, K. 02, S. , SMGLA96, ZH99]. However, a secure routing protocol
can only guarantee the correct behavior of mobile nodes to discover, repair, and salvage routes
but cannot protect the following data traﬃc that goes through the discovered routes. In other
words, a secure routing protocol ensures that all nodes follow the protocol speciﬁcations but is
oblivious to what these speciﬁcations should contain. Since the level of trust in a traditional ad
hoc network cannot be measured or enforced, enemy nodes or compromised nodes may participate
21
correctly in route discovery and then intercept and ﬁlter the following data packets to disrupt
communication. Compromised users may use the information gleaned from transit packets to
mount an attack or anticipate combat moves to their advantage. Since there is no penalty or
punishment for such misbehavior, in general, nodes have no incentive to behave well, as long as
they follow the speciﬁcations of the routing protocol.
Vulnerable
Mobile Nodes
Absence of Routing
Infrastructure
Trustworthiness
of Transit Nodes
Trusted Routing 
Figure 3.2: Situation for Security-aware Routing
A trustworthy routing service relies on the network property of the trustworthiness of transit
nodes. This network property is aﬀected by two changing environmental factors: physical vulner-
ability of the transit nodes and the absence of specialized routing infrastructure. By quantifying
the trustworthiness of participating nodes, the trustworthiness of a network route can be eﬀectively
captured. Based on these observations, we deﬁne the situation for trustworthy ad hoc routing
protocols as in Figure 3.2.
3.2 Security-Aware ad hoc Routing (SAR)
Most ad hoc routing protocols were designed as modiﬁcations or augmentations to traditional
routing protocols for wired networks [C. 94]. These protocols send updates and react to topology
changes, using monitoring and other infrastructure support to maintain routing tables. Current
research focuses on pure on-demand [J. , C. 99] routing protocols, and more recently, on augmen-
tations that exploit additional information available on the ad hoc nodes [Y. 98, R. 97, S. 98] to
improve the quality of routes and reduce performance overheads.
Most of the protocols that have been proposed so far focus on discovering the shortest path
between two nodes as fast as possible. In other words, the length of the routes is the only metric
used in these protocols. Some protocols trade performance and simpliﬁed management to obtain
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bounded sub-optimal paths to speed up the route discovery process [Z. 97, P. 99]. However, the
protocol metric is still the length of the routes, measured typically as hop-count. In this chapter,
we contend that that there are applications that require more than just the assurance that their
route has the shortest length. We argue that end users must be able to specify the required level
of trustworthiness for their routes with respect to metrics that are relevant to them. Routes that
satisfy these requirements may or may not exist depending on the changing network conditions
and such changing situation must be conveyed to the end users so that they can adequately adapt
their behavior. Our approach shares certain similarity with the policy based routing protocols for
QoS [E. ].
3.2.1 Protocol
For simplicity, we assume that the base protocol is an on-demand protocol similar to AODV [C. 99]
or DSR [J. ]. In the original protocol, when a node wants to communicate with another node,
it broadcasts a Route Request or RREQ packet to its neighbors. The RREQ is propagated to
neighbors of neighbors and so on, using controlled ﬂooding. The RREQ packets set up a reverse path
to the source of the RREQ on intermediate routers that forward this packet. If any intermediate
node already has a path to the RREQ destination, this intermediate node replies with a Route
Reply or RREP packet, using the reverse path to the source. Otherwise, if there exists a route
(or connectivity) in the ad hoc network, the RREQ packet will eventually reach the intended
destination. The destination node generates a RREP packet, and the reverse path is used to set
up a route in the forward direction (RPF or Reverse Path Forwarding).
In SAR, we embed our security metric into the RREQ packet itself, and change the forwarding
behavior of the protocol with respect to RREQs. Intermediate nodes receive an RREQ packet with
a particular security metric or trust level. SAR ensures that this node can only process the packet
or forward it if the node itself can provide the required security or has the required authorization or
trust level. If the node cannot provide the required security, the RREQ is dropped. If an end-to-end
path with the required security attributes can be found, a suitably modiﬁed RREP is sent from an
intermediate node or the eventual destination. SAR can be implemented based on any on-demand
ad hoc routing protocol with suitable modiﬁcations. In this chapter, we use AODV [C. 99] as our
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platform to implement SAR.
3.2.2 Behavior
Our modiﬁcation to the traditional ad hoc routing protocol changes the nature of the routes dis-
covered in an ad hoc network. The route discovered by SAR between two communicating entities
may not be the shortest route in terms of hop-count. However, SAR is able to ﬁnd a route with a
quantiﬁable guarantee of security. If one or more routes that satisfy the required security attributes
exist, SAR will ﬁnd the shortest such route. If all of the nodes on the shortest path (in terms of
hop count) between two nodes can satisfy the security requirements, SAR will ﬁnd routes that are
optimal. However, if the ad hoc network does not have a path with nodes that meet the RREQ’s
security requirements, SAR may fail to ﬁnd a route even if the network is connected.
3.2.3 Protocol Metrics
In this subsection, we enumerate diﬀerent techniques to measure or specify the quality of security of
a route discovered by our generalized SAR protocol. The ﬁrst technique is the explicit representation
of trust levels using a simple hierarchy that reﬂects organizational privileges. The second is the
use of security capability of participating nodes. The next subsection enumerates the diﬀerent
techniques used to protect the integrity of routing messages.
Trust Hierarchy
SAR provides applications the ability to incorporate explicit trust levels into the route discovery
process. Most organizations have an internal hierarchy of privileges. For example, in our battleﬁeld
scenario, the military ranks of the users of the ad hoc nodes form an explicit partial-ordering of
privilege levels. A simple way of incorporating trust levels into ad hoc networks is to mirror the or-
ganizational hierarchy, and associate a number with each privilege level. These numbers represent
the security/importance/capability of the mobile nodes and also of the routes. Simple comparison
operators can sort these levels to reﬂect their position in the actual hierarchy. This closely follows
research in information ﬂow theory [SV98] and mandatory access control (MAC) [BP75]. In infor-
mation ﬂow theory, a piece of information can only ﬂow into a variable of equal or higher security
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level. Similarly, in mandatory access control schemes, an object can be only accessed by subjects
of equal or higher security clearance. SAR mirrors such structure by viewing data packets as the
objects to be protected and intermediate nodes as the subjects that try to access the objects.
Security Capabilities
In addition to the ranks of the mobile nodes, SAR incorporates the nodes’ capability to perform
necessary security operations. The list of available operations will vary depending on the deploy-
ment but typically include capability to create and verify digital signatures, encrypt and decrypt
data packets and other relevant security operations. By explicitly including the security capabil-
ities as a routing criteria, a source node can choose routes composed with mobile nodes that are
adequately equipped for the necessary security support. The required set of security operations is
set in a security attribute bit vector inside the route request message.
Protecting the Protocol Metric Requirement
It is important to note that that both trust level and security capability metrics must be immutable.
A node with a lower trust level must not be able to arbitrarily change its trust level or change the
trust level of the RREQ request it forwards. To provide this guarantee, many techniques can be
employed. If keys can be distributed a priori or a key agreement can be reached by some form of
authentication, the simplest technique is to encrypt the portion of the RREQ and RREP headers
that contain the trust level. If all of the nodes in a trust level share a key, any node that does
not belong to this level cannot decrypt or process the packet and is forced to drop it. If a node is
compromised, tamper-prooﬁng can prevent attackers from learning the values of the keys. In the
design of SAR, we leverage related research in key management for ad hoc networks and assume
that some mechanism to distribute keys and shared secrets, such as our own situation-aware key
management are already in place.
3.3 Protection
In this section, we develop an attack classiﬁcation and itemize the protection oﬀered by SAR against
attacks on the trust hierarchy and the information in transit in the routing protocol messages. Other
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attacks on ad hoc networks and related solutions are also brieﬂy discussed.
3.3.1 Trust levels
Attacks on the trust hierarchy can be broadly classiﬁed as Outsider Attacks and Insider Attacks,
based on the trust value associated with the identity or the source of the attack. SAR modiﬁes
the behavior of route discovery, tying in protocol behavior with the trust level of a user. What is
also needed is a binding between the identity of the user with the associated trust level. Without
this binding, any user can impersonate anybody else and obtain the privileges associated with
higher trust levels. To prevent this, stronger access control mechanisms are required (AAA or
Authentication, Authorization and Accounting). To force the nodes and users to respect the trust
hierarchy, cryptographic techniques such as encryption, public key certiﬁcates, shared secrets etc.,
can be employed. For example, all authenticated users belonging to a trust level can share a secret
key.
Traditionally strong authentication schemes have been used to combat outsider attacks. The
identity of a user is certiﬁed by a centralized authority and can be veriﬁed using a simple challenge-
response protocol. Various schemes including the application of threshold cryptography, techniques
for key sharing [AG00, BSSW02, CHB03, HBC01, KZL+01, ZH99], and techniques for key agree-
ment between multiple cooperating entities in dynamic collaborative groups [Y. 00a] have been
proposed to tackle the lack of a centralized authority in an ad hoc network. Our open design allows
us to incorporate any of these mechanisms. For example, if one key is used per level, the trust
levels are immutable and the trust hierarchy can be enforced. In our implementation, for simplicity,
we use a simple shared secret to generate a symmetric encryption/decryption key per trust level.
Packets are encrypted using this key and nodes and users belonging to diﬀerent levels cannot even
read the RREQ or RREP packets. Any user or node that is an outsider cannot obtain this key.
Insider attacks are launched by compromised users within a protection domain or trust level.
The users may be behaving maliciously, or their identity may be compromised (key is broken
etc.). However, insider attacks are generally contained within the compromised node’s trust level.
Routing protocol packets in existing ad hoc algorithms do not carry authenticated identities or
authorization credentials and compromised nodes can potentially cause a lot of damage. Insider
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attacks are hard to prevent in general at the protocol level. Some techniques to prevent insider
attacks include secure transient associations [F. 99], tamper-proof or tamper-resistant nodes etc.
For example, every time a user wants to send a RREQ, the node may require that a user re-key a
password or present a ﬁngerprint for biometric analysis to prove their identity. If the device is lost
or captured by an unauthorized user, and an attempt to send RREQs is made, this is detected by
the node. The node can then destroy its keys to avoid capture (tamper prooﬁng).
3.3.2 Information in Transit
In this subsection, we examine speciﬁc threats to information in transit. In addition to exploiting
vulnerabilities related to the protection and enforcement of the trust levels, compromised or enemy
nodes can utilize the information carried in the packets to launch attacks. These attacks can lead to
corruption of information, disclosure of sensitive information, theft of legitimate service from other
protocol entities, or denial of network service to protocol entities [J. 97]. Threats to information in
transit include [WVW, J. 97, W. 95]:
• Interruption: The ﬂow of routing protocol packets, especially route discovery messages and
updates, can be interrupted or blocked by malicious nodes. Attackers can selectively ﬁlter
control messages and updates and force the routing protocol to behave incorrectly. In SAR,
a malicious node that interrupts the ﬂow of packets belonging to a higher or lower trust
level cannot cause an attack, because it cannot participate in forwarding these packets. If a
node ﬁlters packets that belong to the same trust level as itself, the broadcast nature of the
communication channel can help in detection of interruption attacks by other listeners within
transmission range [S. 00].
• Interception and Subversion: Data traﬃc and control messages, e.g., the “keep-alive” and
“are-you-up?” messages can be deﬂected or rerouted. In SAR, these messages are protected
by digital signatures. In addition, the use of ﬂooding makes these attacks superﬂuous.
• Modiﬁcation: The integrity of the information packets can be compromised by modifying the
packets themselves. SAR provides a suite of cryptographic techniques that can be incorpo-
rated on a need-to-use basis to prevent modiﬁcation. These include digital signatures and
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encryption.
• Fabrication: False route and metric information can be inserted into legitimate protocol
packets by malicious insider nodes. In such a situation, the sender of the RREQ may receive
multiple RREPs. Currently, SAR picks the ﬁrst RREP that arrives at the sender. The sender
can be modiﬁed to verify that the RREP has credentials that guarantee the integrity of the
metrics and repudiate the ownership of attributes by challenging the intermediate nodes. We
plan to incorporate this behavior in the future.
vulnerabilities and passive attacks. Routing updates that reﬂect transient topology changes can be
stored and retransmitted at a later point of time to trigger false updates and false route propaga-
tions. SAR provide automatic replay protection by using sequence numbers and timestamps. Most
of the attacks described in this section are also called active attacks as the adversaries actively at-
tempt to change the behavior of the protocol. The complement of these attacks are passive attacks,
where the behavior of the adversary is more subtle. Examples of passive attacks include covert
channels, traﬃc analysis, sniﬃng to compromise keys etc. The information inadvertently disclosed
to passive attackers by the protocol packets, can be used to launch active attacks. Protection
against eavesdropping or sniﬃng at the MAC layer can be accomplished by using a suitable MAC
layer encryption protocol. Protection against passive attacks are diﬃcult in general and many
techniques have been proposed to tackle these problems.
3.4 Implementation
In this section, we describe an implementation of SAR built as an augmentation to the AODV [C. 99]
protocol in the ns2 [ns2] network simulator. We retain most of ns2 AODV’s original behavior, such
as on-demand route discovery using ﬂooding, reverse path maintenance in intermediate nodes,
and forward path setup via RREP messages. We modify the RREQ (Route REQuest) and the
RREP(Route REPly) packet formats to carry additional security information. We call our modi-
ﬁed AODV protocol SAODV (Security-aware AODV).
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3.4.1 Changes to RREQ
SAODV provides support to enforce the trust hierarchy and also enables customizable security
attributes for participating nodes. Three new ﬁelds are added into the original AODV RREQ
packet format. The ﬁrst ﬁeld RQ SEC REQUIREMENT is set by the sender and indicates the
desired level of trust within an explicit hierarchy for the route to the destination. What values
to assign to this ﬁeld is left to the end users. This ﬁeld can be used to carry simple integer
values reﬂecting the existing hierarchies in a user’s organization. For example, if the application is
a military situation, the security requirement ﬁeld can carry the information about the minimum
rank required to relay this communication. In this case, we can use simple integer values to indicate
the ranks.
The second ﬁeld RQ SEC QOP VECTOR contains a bit vector that represents the list of re-
quired security capabilities of participating nodes. For example, if the sender chooses to require
simple hash, digital signature, and content encryption over the SAODV packets, the matching bits
in the ﬁeld is set to indicate the sender’s requirements. The meanings of each bit in the bit vector
is left to the deployment.
The last ﬁeld added to the RREQ packet is the security guarantee, or RQ SEC GUARANTEE.
This ﬁeld indicates the maximum level of security aﬀorded by all discovered route. It is updated
at every hop during the route discovery phase. If RQ SEC REQUIREMENT is represented in
integers, RQ SEC GUARANTEE is the minimum of the security levels of the participating nodes.
If RQ SEC REQUIREMENT is represented in bit vectors, RQ SEC GUARANTEE is the result
of bit-wise AND operations of all the bit vectors representing the capabilities of the participating
nodes. This information is copied into RREP and sent back to the sender indicating the actual
security the sender can use. The sender can use this security guarantee value to determine whether it
needs a more secure connection or not. In addition, SAODV also has support for digital signatures.
If the application requested integrity support, a new ﬁeld to store the computed digital signatures
is added to the RREQ.
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3.4.2 Changes to RREP
One additional ﬁeld is also added to the RREP. When an RREQ successfully traverses the network
from the sender to the destination, the value of the RQ SEC GUARANTEE ﬁeld in the RREQ
packet is copied into the RP SEC GUARANTEE ﬁeld in the RREP packet. The sender can use
this value to determine the security level over the whole route. Also, this value is copied into the
routing tables of the nodes in the reverse path, to maintain security information about cached
routes.
3.4.3 SAODV Route Discovery
In a SAODV route discovery, the source node set the RQ SEC REQUIREMENT ﬁeld to the re-
quired level of trustworthiness and RQ SEC QOP VECTOR ﬁelds with required set of security
capabilities and broadcast the RREQ packet. When an intermediate node receives a RREQ packet,
the protocol ﬁrst checks if the node can satisfy the security requirement indicated in the packet. If
the node is secure enough to participate in the routing and also capable of performing the opera-
tions listed in the RQ SEC QOP VECTOR ﬁeld. The ﬁrst test on the security level is performed
by a simple arithmetic comparison and the second test on the QoP bit vector can be done with a
bit-wise comparison operator. SAODV behaves like AODV and the RREQ packet is forwarded to
its neighbors. If the intermediate node cannot satisfy the security requirement, the RREQ packet
is dropped and not forwarded. When an intermediate node decides to forward the request, a new
ﬁeld in the RREQ packet is updated. RQ SEC GUARANTEE ﬁeld is useful in the case where
route discovery discovers a route that is more secure than the sender asked for. It is also useful for
security-aware applications to get more detailed information about the quality of security for the
routes discovered.
This approach opens the question of the eﬀect of malicious nodes in networks. Since it is not
uncommon to assume that some mobile nodes will either be captured or compromised during the
operation, SAODV must provide a way to guarantee the cooperation of nodes. This cooperation is
achieved by encrypting the RREQ headers or by adding digital signatures and distributing keys to
nodes that belong to the same level in the trust hierarchy that can decrypt these headers and re-
encrypt them when necessary. It is also possible that a mobile node with a set of keys and credentials
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is compromised and the keys and the credentials are exposed to adversaries. In such cases, the
adversary can assume the identity of the compromised nodes but cannot do anything more than
the compromised node was originally allowed to do. Still, it is desirable to design the underlying
trust management system to withstand such attacks and localize the eﬀect of compromised nodes.
The arrival of a RREQ packet at the destination indicates the presence of a route from the sender
to the receiver that satisﬁes the security requirement speciﬁed by the sender. The destination node
sends the RREP packet as in AODV, but with additional information indicating the maximum
security available over the route. This information is suitably protected using the same mechanism
used to protect the RREQ packet so that only nodes that belong to a particular trust level can
process these packets. The value of the RQ SEC GUARANTEE ﬁeld in the RREQ packet is
copied to the RP SEC GUARANTEE ﬁeld in the RREP packet. When the RREP packet arrives
at an intermediate node in the reverse path, intermediate nodes that are allowed to participate
update their routing tables as in AODV and also record the new RP SEC GUARANTEE value.
This value indicates the maximum security available on the cached forward path. When a trusted
intermediate node answers a RREQ query using cached information, this value is compared to the
security requirement in the RREQ packet and only when the forward path can guarantee enough
security is the cached route information sent back in the RREP.
3.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we present the performance evaluation of SAODV protocol. The main goal of our
evaluation is to measure the network performance of SAODV using simulation time and delivery
ratio of the data packets and also the newly added overhead caused by the SAR-related operations
including security-aware route discovery, digital signatures, and encrypted packets. The original
AODV protocol is used as a benchmark to study the pure processing overheads of SAODV. Since
SAODV enables applications to specify security attributes in their routes, the behavior of SAODV
and AODV cannot be compared directly. As our baseline, we use SAODV/Disabled, a protocol that
behaves like AODV with respect to its dropping and forwarding behavior, and also includes the
additional overheads and modiﬁed packet formats of SAODV. The simulations were run for diﬀerent
security attributes, packet formats, traﬃc patterns, and trust hierarchies. Across our experiments,
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we observe that SAODV sends fewer routing protocol control messages (RREPs, RREQs, etc.) for
the same number of ﬂows and the same amount of application data. As a result, although the
overhead per control message is higher in SAODV, the performance impact is sustainable. We use
ns-2 network simulator for our evaluations.
3.5.1 Simulation Set-up
Our results are based on the simulation set up for 50 nodes moving around in a 670m by 670m
region. Nodes move according to the random way-point model described in [BMJ+98]. We classify
the 50 nodes in our simulations into three levels viz., high, medium and low, each with 15, 15, and
20 nodes respectively. When a node sends out the route request, it uses its own security level as the
security requirement for the route. In all of our measurements, we send the same amount of data
(about 10000 packets) for the same number of ﬂows (20) at the same rate. Our simulation is run
until the ﬂows complete sending all packets. Within this set-up, we measure and compare the overall
completion time and the number of control messages sent. Two diﬀerent traﬃc patterns are used to
drive the simulations. Traﬃc pattern 1 consists of 20 CBR ﬂows. 10% of the ﬂows are between the
high level nodes, 20% between the medium and 70% between the low level nodes. Traﬃc pattern 2
also has 20 CBR ﬂows, but the distribution is 33%, 33%, 34% for the high, medium, and low level
nodes. Pattern 1 will generate three levels of overlays where low-security layer is heavily populated
with and the medium- and high-security layers are relatively sparse. In comparison, Pattern 2
generates three levels of overlays where high-security layer contains about 33% of mobile nodes,
medium-security layer 66%, and high-security layer 33%, resulting in better-connected overlays at
the higher-security layers. The packet size is 512 bytes, and the sending rate is 4 packets/second.
The maximum number of packets in each ﬂow is 500. In Section 3.5.2 we measure the overhead for
enforcing the trust hierarchy. Section 3.5.3 presents our results for secure routing, speciﬁcally, the
overhead of adding encryption and digital signatures to SAODV’s RREPs.
3.5.2 SAODV Processing Overheads
SAODV has larger RREQ and RREP packets compared to AODV and all nodes participating in
route discovery must do additional processing to check the security requirements and update the
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security guarantee. Initially, SAODV is conﬁgured to do the trust enforcement processing, but not
drop the RREQ packets when it is supposed to. As mentioned earlier, this version is a baseline
in performance measurement to show how SAODV processing aﬀects protocol behavior. The pure
overhead of the SAODV modiﬁcation is measured in comparison to the original AODV.
Table 3.1: Overall Simulation Time
Traﬃc Pattern 1 Traﬃc Pattern 2
AODV 2803 2844
SAODV/Disabled 2844 2918
As shown in Table 3.1, with traﬃc pattern 1, SAODV takes 1% longer to ﬁnish the whole
simulation and with traﬃc pattern 2, less than 3% more. Pattern 2 includes more ﬂows with higher
security requirements that requires longer processing time for packets. This means that the pure
overhead of adding additional processing to enable security, in the absence of dropping, is not
prohibitive. We use this SAODV without RREQ dropping, SAODV/Disabled, as our baseline for
rest of the performance measurements.
Route Discovery
Next, we ran SAODV/Disabled and SAODV with explicit trust values on the same traﬃc patterns to
observe the diﬀerence in protocol behavior. The number of routes discovered by SAODV/Disabled
and SAODV and the number of routes that violate the security requirements in SAODV/Disabled
were recorded. Since SAODV/Disabled behaves like the original AODV, some of the routes found
violated the security requirements. This is summarized in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Number of Routes Discovered
Traﬃc Pattern 1 Traﬃc Pattern 2
Total number of route discovery by SAODV/Disabled 93 95
Routes violating security requirement by SAODV/Disabled 14 19
Routes discovery by SAODV 80 73
Although SAODV/Disabled found more routes when the trust levels were enforced, 14 and 19
of these routes respectively were unusable. SAODV discovered fewer routes, but these routes are
guaranteed to obey the trust requirements of their senders.
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Routing Message Overheads
Table 3.3 shows the numbers of routing protocol messages in SAODV/Disabled and SAODV. We
observe that there is a drop in the number of RREQ messages sent in SAODV. This is because
a RREQ is dropped and not forwarded when the intermediate nodes cannot handle the security
requirements of the RREQ packets.
Table 3.3: Routing Message Overhead
RREQ RREP Routing Msgs
Pattern 1 Pattern 2 Pattern 1 Pattern 2 Pattern 1 Pattern 2
SAODV/Disabled 2333 2566 107 102 2410 2668
SAODV 2285 1504 80 73 2365 1577
These numbers imply that SAODV generates fewer routing messages, while enabling applica-
tions to ﬁnd more relevant routes. In the case of Pattern 1, there was a decrease of 2% in RREQ
messages and 25% in RREP messages. For Pattern 2, the results were more accentuated (41% in
RREQs, and 27% in RREPs). The reason is that the trust hierarchy is more equitably distributed
in Pattern 2 and routes tend to be shorter.
Overall Simulation Time and Transmitted Data
SAODV restricts the route discovery process to only routes that can satisfy the requirements. This
feature may force packets to follow longer but more secure routes and result in taking more time
to ﬁnish the communication. The overhead of the protocol is illustrated in Table 3.4. The overall
time to complete transmission of all of the traﬃc ﬂows in both SAODV with trust enforcement and
SAODV/Disabled and the total amount of data transmitted are illustrated in the Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Overall Simulation Time and Transmitted Data
Simulation Time Transmitted Data
Pattern 1 Pattern 2 Pattern 1 Pattern 2
SAODV/Disabled 2844 2918 10023 10022
SAODV 2911 2925 10028 10017
With RREQ dropping, SAODV takes 2.3% and 0.2% more time to ﬁnish in traﬃc patterns 1
and 2 compared to SAODV/Disabled. Patter 1 includes a small fraction of higher level nodes there
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any traﬃc originating from such higher level nodes goes through much longer routes. Although
SAODV takes marginally more time to ﬁnish communication, it still ﬁnds routes in most cases,
and delivers almost the same amount of data from senders to the receivers as shown in the table.
Route Optimality
The data packets may follow longer routes in SAODV if the shorter routes cannot satisfy the
security requirements. Table 3.5 shows the length of the routes each data packet travels compared
to the shortest possible routes at the time. The optimal length means that the packet actually
follows the shortest route between the sender and the destination at the time of transmission. The
table lists the the number of packets that traversed a route with each length. With Pattern 1, we
see that a signiﬁcant number of packets take longer routes, especially among transmissions in the
higher trust levels (34%). The impact is not as severe in traﬃc pattern 2 (14%) since the trust
hierarchy is more equitably distributed in pattern 2.
Table 3.5: Route Optimality
Optimal Length Optimal Length + 1 Optimal Length + 2 Optimal Length + 3
Traﬃc Pattern 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
SAODV/Disabled 7700 8570 2142 1266 130 132 0 4
SAODV 6481 8549 2414 1273 1075 130 0 3
3.5.3 Secure Routing Measurements
The SAODV protocol can be augmented with hash digests (SAODV/Digital Signature) and sym-
metric encryption mechanisms (SAODV/Encryption). The overhead of including security attributes
in the RREQ messages are presented in this subsection. The signed hash digests provide message
integrity, whereas encrypting packets guarantees their conﬁdentiality. Nodes that have the same
trust level share the same encryption and decryption keys. The MD5 Hash algorithm [Riv92] and
the Blowﬁsh block cipher [Sch94] were used for these measurements. We present the measurements
for Traﬃc Pattern 1 only. The results for Pattern 2 show a similar trend.
The entire RREQ packet was encrypted, with the exception of the packet-type ﬁeld. For
SAODV with digital signatures, an additional ﬁeld was added to the RREQ header. The MD5
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Table 3.6: Routing Message Overheads for Secure Routing
RREQ RREP Routing Msgs
Encryption Signed Hash Encryption Signed Hash Encryption Signed Hash
SAODV/Disabled 2225 2219 77 85 2378 2381
SAODV 2175 2148 74 80 2341 2311
hash algorithm was used to generate a MAC (Message Authentication Code), along with Blowﬁsh
encryption to protect the integrity of the MAC. The SAODV/Disabled protocol reﬂects the overhead
of adding the extra ﬁeld in the header. In Table 3.6, we observe that SAODV/Encryption and
SAODV/Digital Signature sent fewer RREQs and RREPs than SAODV/Disabled. This is because
nodes that were not capable of decrypting the encrypted RREQ packets, or could not verify the
signatures, dropped these packets without forwarding. SAODV/Encryption showed a 9.1% decrease
and SAODV/Digital Signatures showed a 17% decrease. This reinforces our claim that SAODV
sends fewer control messages (RREQs and RREPs) than SAODV/Disabled, although each packet
needs more processing.
Table 3.7: Overall Simulation Time and Transmitted Data
Simulation Time Transmitted Data
Encryption Signed Hash Encryption Signed Hash
SAODV/Disabled 2899 2875 10024 10025
SAODV 2918 2933 10026 10017
Table 3.7 presents overall simulation time and transmitted data. Adding encryption increases
overall simulation time by 0.7% and adding digital signatures by 2% (in addition to the trust
enforcement overheads). However, the number of packets transmitted was approximately equal.
3.6 Summary of Contributions
SAR enables the discovery of trustworthy routes in a mobile ad hoc environment. Its integrated
security metrics allow applications to capture and enforce explicit cooperative trust relationships
instead of blindly trusting the intermediate nodes to be trustworthy. In other words, nodes in
SAR can measure the trustworthiness of the intermediate nodes based on the available situational
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information therefore of the route. Measurement of trustworthiness is performed for each route
discovery process, enabling constant monitoring of the changing situation in an ad hoc network.
The design of SAR can be easily incorporated into generic ad hoc routing protocols as illustrated by
our implementation example - SAODV. The processing overheads in SAR are oﬀset by restricting
the scope of the ﬂooding for more relevant routes, providing comparable price/performance beneﬁts.
SAR is not a stand-alone security service. It requires the support for secure routing that secures
the control messages along with a reliable authentication service for identifying all participants. In
the next four chapters, we present our work in situation-aware authentication service provided by
ad hoc key management frameworks.
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Chapter 4
Situation-Aware Key Management for
Ad Hoc Networks
Security begins with reliable authentication. Most fundamental security services, including access
control, auditing, and authorization rely on an authentication service to provide reliable identiﬁ-
cation of participants. A well-established way to provide an authentication service in distributed
systems is public key cryptography [W. 76], where an entity is represented with a pair of keys. The
public key is used as the ID of the entity while the private key is used to prove the ownership of the
public key. The public key is disseminated in the form of a digital certiﬁcate that binds the entity’s
identity to the entity’s public key. The successful use of public key cryptography requires an eﬃ-
cient mechanism to manage such digital certiﬁcates. In this chapter, we investigate the challenges
of providing a key management service within the limits of ad hoc networks and demonstrate the
need for situation-awareness in ad hoc key management.
4.1 Key Management in Ad Hoc Networks
Various designs for ad hoc key management frameworks have been proposed. However, it is im-
portant to note that none of these approaches have been shown to provide a universal solution in
dynamic environments. This limitation mainly comes from the fact that most approaches try to
adapt solutions from wired environments without adequately addressing the speciﬁc challenges in
ad hoc networks. In other words, hidden assumptions were not clearly identiﬁed during the design
phase. To understand why previous approaches fail, we ﬁrst identify three fundamental goals of ad
hoc key management. Then, we follow up with two underlying principles for key management in ad
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hoc networks to expose the underlying hidden assumptions in ad hoc key management framework
designs: node participation and the use of a trusted third party. While most previous approaches
adhere to one of these principles, it is often at the expense of the other, resulting in limited success.
After deﬁning each principle in detail, we discuss existing approaches with an emphasis on how
they achieve or fail to achieve these proposed principles. To capture the changing situation into a
intuitive metric for end users, we present our trust model to capture trust relationships among the
mobile nodes in the network and our Metrics of Authentication (MoA) that translates the trust
relationships into a concise and intuitive measure. Finally, we present the conceptual design of a
situation-aware key management framework that we will use as the design guideline in the following
chapters.
4.1.1 Three Goals for Ad Hoc Key Management
A successful key management framework for ad hoc networks must satisfy three fundamental re-
quirements: fault tolerance, security, and availability. These terms are sometimes used interchange-
ably, mainly because they are not independent of each other. To avoid confusion, we ﬁrst clearly
deﬁne these terms.
• Fault Tolerance: The goal of fault tolerance is to maintain correct operation in the presence of
faulty nodes. We restrict the deﬁnition of faulty to non-malicious. Fault tolerance is related
to availability because as long as the service can tolerate the faults, such faults do not impact
service availability.
• Security: Acting as the trust anchor for the whole network, a key management framework
must be designed to be resilient against all levels of attacks and robust enough to withstand
a relatively high fraction of compromised nodes.
• Availability: Traditionally, the term availability has been used in conjunction with fault
tolerance. However, in ad hoc networks, availability is also highly dependent on network
connectivity which, in turn, is aﬀected by the node mobility. In wired networks, if the service
is online, it is by deﬁnition available since connectivity between clients and the service is
usually guaranteed. In ad hoc networks, clients may not be able to contact an operational
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service due to unstable and rapidly changing connectivity.
These three requirements are not independent of each other. For that reason, careless attempts
to improve any one aspect may aﬀect the others adversely. For example, a simple and very eﬀective
way to improve fault tolerance of PKI is to replicate the CA. However, this approach makes the
overall framework more vulnerable. Interactions between these requirements must be throughly
understood before designing a distributed key management framework.
To understand these interactions in ad hoc environments, we present two design principles for ad
hoc key management in the next section. These principles are based on the unique characteristics
of ad hoc environments and used to guide the design of ad hoc key management frameworks that
operate within the limitation of ad hoc environments.
4.1.2 Two Principles for Ad Hoc Key Management
In this section, we discuss the details of two key principles for ad hoc key management framework
design. Most current key management frameworks for ad hoc networks implicitly embody one of
the two underlying principles, while sacriﬁcing or ignoring the other.
Node Participation
The node participation principle states that a key management framework for ad hoc networks
should rely on a large number of nodes for availability, but a smaller group of nodes for security.
This is to maintain a balance between two potentially conﬂicting goals of fault tolerance and
availability. Given the physical vulnerability of mobile nodes in ad hoc networks, it is not eﬀective
to burden a single node with the responsibility of providing a security service like key management.
A natural way to address this problem is to distribute the security service over multiple nodes, hence
improving fault tolerance. In general, this group can span from a single node to all nodes in the
network. However, blind and equal distribution of security functionality over too many nodes leads
to a vulnerable system. This observation leads to two important questions as to the participation
of nodes in key management. First, How many of the nodes should participate? The participation
of a higher fraction of nodes in the network, can improve availability and fault tolerance. However,
without careful consideration, higher participation can also lead to higher vulnerability. This leads
40
to the second question: How should the nodes participate? When a security service is divided
across a large number of nodes with equal responsibilities, the availability of the service increases
since there are more nodes that an end user can contact. However, this improved availability also
helps adversaries locate and compromise these nodes and eventually compromise the security of the
service. Therefore, a blind and equal distribution of functionality to multiple nodes can degrade
the overall security. Instead, core functionalities of the security service should be distributed to a
restricted set of secure nodes, providing strong security and high fault tolerance. The rest of the
nodes share lower level functionality to improve the availability of the core nodes. Compromising
any of these low level nodes should not compromise overall security, but only aﬀect the availability
of the core service.
Use of a Trusted Third Party
The use of a trusted third party (TTP) principle states that a key management framework should
use a TTP to maintain a high level of security of the framework to provide high quality authenti-
cation services, eﬀectively requiring the use of PKI. Without a clear trust anchor in the network,
authentications can only rely on casual trust relationships. Since there are no guarantees about
the behavior of participating nodes, any authentication based on such casual relationships cannot
be trusted for security-sensitive applications. A TTP provides a trust anchor that can be used
as the basis for further trust relationships. Since every node trusts the TTP, authentication pro-
vided by the TTP is trusted with a high level of conﬁdence. Since it is not trivial to maintain
any form of a TTP in ad hoc networks, it may appear attractive to use a fully decentralized key
management framework that does not rely on a TTP. However, in any approach without a TTP, an
authentication must rely on casual and voluntary relationships between nodes or an accumulation
of such relationships. Essentially, without trustworthy authentication, no further security service
can be built to guarantee a high level of assurance. Therefore, using a TTP is crucial for any ad
hoc network with strong security requirements. When more than one TTP is available in a single
network, they can be used to improve the quality of authentication even further. However, we do
not investigate the issue of using more than one TTP(s) in this thesis.
Given these two principles for key management in ad hoc networks, we now discuss current
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approaches and how they succeed or fail in supporting these principles.
4.1.3 Certiﬁcate Chaining
Authentication by a chain of authorities has commonly been used in large scale dynamic networks
without a single authority [Ken93, Zim95]. In general, authentication is represented as a set of
digital certiﬁcates that form a chain. Certiﬁcate chaining does not require heavy infrastructure
or complex bootstrapping procedures and every node has identical roles and responsibilities. In
certiﬁcate chaining, any node can issue a certiﬁcate to any other node based on its own discretion.
Given the inherent peer-to-peer nature of certiﬁcate chaining, it is easy to add new nodes into
the system and extend the coverage of the certiﬁcate chaining system. Since an authenticating
node only utilizes local information and does not rely on an external system, certiﬁcate chaining is
very tolerant to faults by deﬁnition. These characteristics of certiﬁcate chaining make it a potential
candidate for key management in ad hoc networks, as realized by Hubaux et al. [CBH03]. Certiﬁcate
chaining achieves the maximum level of node participation, since every node can participates by
issuing certiﬁcates to each other to populate the certiﬁcation graph. However, every node shares
the same responsibilities, limiting the security of the system. Additionally, certiﬁcate chaining fails
to use any TTP. This departure from the the principles leads to two main limitations.
First, since participating nodes operate in a best-eﬀort manner, there can be situations when
authentication cannot be provided. Essentially, a certiﬁcation graph may not be populated enough
to provide certiﬁcate chains for a given pair of nodes. Since there is no means to force mobile
nodes to issue certiﬁcates and keep the certiﬁcation graph dense enough, it is diﬃcult to predict
if any given authentication request can be fulﬁlled, impacting the availability goal. As shown in
two studies [CBH02, McB98] of PGP [Zim95], a 1998 snapshot of the PGP certiﬁcation graph
that included 57582 nodes only had 3100 nodes (5%) in its largest strongly connected component
(SCC) [McB98], while in a more recent snapshot, there is an even larger gap between the total
number of nodes and the size of the largest SCC (2.5%) [CBH02]. Essentially, the currently deployed
PGP system has one large SCC that contains a very small fraction of the nodes and most of the
nodes are scattered to form a sparse graph. This gap is important since only members of the same
SCC can authenticate each other. If a node is outside a SCC, two-way authentication between the
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outside node and any other node is not guaranteed. Considering that PGP has been in operation
for years (since the early 90’s), these characteristics are not expected to change in the near future.
As Capkun suggested in his study of the small world property of PGP graphs, this characteristic is
typical of all PGP-like certiﬁcate chaining systems [CBH02]. However, it still remains a question if
the same property will hold true in ad hoc environments.
Second, without relying on a TTP, any trust relationships must rely on the goodwill and the
correct behavior of all participants. Any single misbehaving or malicious node participating in a
certiﬁcate chain can taint the whole chain and invalidate the authentication. However, since there is
no clear way to tell if a certiﬁcate chain includes any misbehaving nodes, the overall conﬁdence value
of certiﬁcate chains must be relatively low. To combat this problem, several enhancements have
been proposed, including limiting the chain length and using multiple node-disjoint chains [RS99]
and detecting discrepancies from multiple sets of chains [JRN]. Despite these improvements, the
quality of authentication provided by certiﬁcate chaining may still not be high enough to support
strong security goal, and it must be quantiﬁed to provide any meaningful authentication.
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Figure 4.1: Situation Diagram for Certiﬁcate Chaining
Quality of authentication via certiﬁcate chaining depends on two network properties: the trust-
worthiness of the participating nodes and a high enough participation ratio of mobile nodes. The
trustworthiness of mobile nodes is adversely aﬀected by two underlying environmental factors: the
inherent vulnerability of mobile nodes and also by the absence of a trust infrastructure. In other
words, mobile nodes that participate in certiﬁcate chaining cannot be completely trusted and any
authentication via certiﬁcate chaining must be discounted for that reason. The eﬀectiveness of cer-
tiﬁcate chaining is also aﬀected by the amount of participation of mobile nodes. Since the formation
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of a certiﬁcation graph is left to voluntary cooperation of mobile nodes, it cannot be guaranteed
that the resulting certiﬁcation graph will contain enough certiﬁcates to be useful. Therefore, the
formation of a certiﬁcation graph is again adversely aﬀected by the vulnerability of mobile nodes
and also unstable network topology. Based on these observations, we identify the situation diagram
for a certiﬁcate chaining system as represented as in Figure 4.1.3.
4.1.4 Distributed CA Approaches
To address the unique challenges in ad hoc networks, several distributed CA approaches employ
threshold cryptography to securely distribute the CA’s functionality over multiple nodes [KZL+01,
WMB99, YK03, ZH99]. In this chapter, we focus on how each of these approaches satisﬁes or does
not satisfy the design principles. CA functionality is distributed in such a manner that an adversary
must compromise a certain fraction of the key shares to compromise the distributed CA itself. At
the same time, an end user need only access a subset of the distributed CA nodes to get certiﬁcation
services. Wu et al. ﬁrst suggest a distributed CA based on threshold cryptography [WMB99] and
Zhou et al. propose its application to ad hoc networks [ZH99]. Kong et al. [KZL+01] follow through
by designing full key management frameworks followed by our own MOCA framework [YK04b]. It
is clear that all distributed CA approaches employ the use of a TTP principle, satisfying the security
goal of ad hoc key management. While all distributed CA approaches appear to similarly address
the node participation principle, the approaches diﬀer in how they choose nodes to participate and
this diﬀerence has impacts on all three goals: fault tolerance, security and availability. Kong et al.
proposed a distributed CA solution where every mobile node in an ad hoc network acts as a CA
node and shares the responsibility of a CA [KZL+01]. This approach maximizes node participation
by utilizing all nodes in the network, achieving very high availability. However, their solution is
vulnerable to adversaries that can compromise a relatively small number of mobile nodes, and also
to Sybil attacks [Dou00]. Essentially, this approach violates the security component of the node
participation principle by involving all nodes in the core security function and fails to meet the
security goal of ad hoc key management. In response to these limitation, we designed MOCA, a
generalized key management framework for all possible conﬁgurations of distributed CA approaches
based on threshold cryptography (See Chapter 5 for details). The results from MOCA suggests
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that the fraction of CA nodes should be kept relatively small to maintain strong security. This
ﬁts well with the security component of the node participation principle that limits the main key
management functions to a small fraction of nodes. However, the MOCA framework sacriﬁces the
ﬁrst part of the principle, and so availability, by not involving the rest of the nodes in any part of
key management. Essentially, Kong et al.’s approach sacriﬁces the security to achieve ubiquitous
availability while MOCA sacriﬁces availability to maintain strong security.
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Figure 4.2: Situation for Ad Hoc PKI
To provide a secure distributed PKI, two network properties are required: availability of secure
and reliable server(s) and stable connectivity between such servers and the rest of the network.
However, maintaining a secure and reliable server inside an ad hoc network is not a trivial task
due to the underlying environmental factors such as inherent vulnerability of mobile nodes and the
absence of any reliable infrastructure. Also, the connectivity between the secure servers and the
rest of the network cannot be guaranteed because of the unstable network topology caused by the
mobility of nodes. These requirements are captured in the situation diagram in Figure 4.2 and
we later use this diagram to drive the design of the MOCA framework as well as the metrics to
measure the quality of authentication provided by distributed PKIs.
Figure 4.3 presents a visual comparison of existing distributed PKI approaches. The ideal goal
of ad hoc PKI is displayed as the solid black rectangle at the upper-right corner where both QoA
and availability remains high and show minimal ﬂuctuations. In comparison, a single CA scenario
shows a low QoA since it is not very diﬃcult to compromise the single CA. Availability of the single
CA is also low due to the changing topology and node mobility. When the CAs are replicated,
the availability is improved at the cost of degrading the QoA even further since the attacks on a
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of Existing Ad Hoc PKIs
CA nodes become even easier. Kong’s approach shows an extreme case where maximal availability
sacriﬁces the security of the framework, resulting in a very low QoA. In the next section, we present
the conceptual design of our situation-aware key management framework based on the observations
presented so far.
4.2 Situation-Aware Key Management Frameworks
As shown in the previous sections, none of the existing ad hoc key management frameworks pro-
vides a perfect and ideal authentication service due to the challenging environmental eﬀects of
ad hoc environments. The goal of a situation-aware key management service is to provide basic
authentication services augmented by a measure of the Quality of Authentication (QoA) so that
end users can accurately understand the quality of the provided authentication service and act
accordingly. QoA for key management services can be measured based on the trust relationships in
the system and observations about network conditions. All of these components are aﬀected by the
current situation. Since an end user cannot be expected to understand the details of the key man-
agement framework designs or the constantly changing conditions of the network, a situation-aware
key management service must provide an interpretation of all of this situational information into
a simple and intuitive measure of QoA. The design of such a framework is captured in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: Situation-Aware Key Management Framework
Each client node in the ad hoc network includes an end user and a situation-aware software agent
called the QoA Engine. The responsibility of the QoA Engine is to take input from the basic key
management service, the end user, and observations about network conditions and provide the end
user with an augmented authentication service with the QoA information, forming the situation-
aware authentication service. Based on this QoA, the end user can either decide to use the provided
service or reject it.
The output QoA is calculated using well-deﬁned Metrics of Authentication (MoA) that use the
situational information captured by the two components of the QoA Engine: the Trust Relationship
Graph (TRG) and the Environment Monitor (EM) as seen in Figure 4.4. The TRG keeps track
of the trust relationships from the end user’s view, using inputs from both the key management
service and the end user. The EM monitors the changes in relevant network conditions, such as the
vulnerability of mobile nodes, the impact from the absence of a trusted entity, and the eﬀects of
network instability. These environmental factors are collected from multiple sources including the
end user, the key management framework and the EM’s own monitoring function. The detailed
eﬀects of each situational factor on the ﬁnal QoA are speciﬁc to the design of the key management
framework and we will discuss in detail how our MoA reﬂects these diﬀerent eﬀects into QoA
measurements in Section 4.2.2.
4.2.1 Modeling Trust Relationships
All authentication services for a distributed system are based on the trust relationships among the
entities in the system and the shape of these trust relationships is heavily aﬀected by the changing
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situation. Since QoA is the means to integrate and express the changing situation, measuring the
QoA of an authentication service must begin with modeling these trust relationships. A digital
certiﬁcate is a popular way of making trust relationships explicit. When one entity has a certain
amount of trust in another, the ﬁrst entity can issue a digital certiﬁcate to that eﬀect.
A natural choice of a data structure for representing and capturing trust relationships is a form of
directed graph. Entities in a distributed system can be modeled as vertices and trust relationships
among them can be captured as edges. Based on a large body of previous work in certiﬁcate
chaining models [BBK94, BLNS86, Ken93, LA98, RS99, Zim95] and some more relevant approaches
for ad hoc environments [YK04a, YK04b], we adopt a weighted directional graph structure called
a Trust Relationship Graph (TRG), TRG = {V,E}, where V is the set of vertices representing
the mobile nodes in the system and E is the set of edges representing the trust relationships
among the mobile nodes. Each edge ei ∈ E has a weight function c(ei) = ci that expresses a
conﬁdence value, which captures the amount of trust that the issuer of the certiﬁcate has on the
target entity. To avoid limiting the applicability of the model, we allow any conﬁdence value
between 0.0 (no trust) and 1.0 (absolute trust). The speciﬁc value assigned by a user to an
issued certiﬁcate is determined by the user for a given network deployment. Network operators
can issue guidelines on appropriate methods to determine conﬁdence values. The Thawte web of
trust system enforces two entities to meet in person to verify identities before any certiﬁcate can
be issued [Tha]. In general, a conﬁdence value is calculated based on the number and quality of
identiﬁcation materials used to prove the target entity’s identity. Al-Muhtadi proposed a novel way
to incorporate inputs from many authentication mechanisms into a single representative value using
fuzzy logic in his PhD thesis [AM05]. His design is essentially a formal model of combining diﬀerent
authentication evidences as used in the Thatwe system. Similarly, interactive trust building systems
like TrustBuilder [Win03] can be employed to calculate appropriate conﬁdence values between any
pair of entities. Another possible approach is to allow each end user to actively communicate with
their peers to collect as much information as possible. However, this approach comes at a high
communication cost, which usually cannot be aﬀorded in ad hoc environments. Therefore, we only
focus on passive information gathering and the best ways to reason about collected information
throughout this thesis. Figure 4.5 illustrates the simplest form of a TRG that contains only two
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Figure 4.6: Trust Relationship Graph of a Certiﬁcate Chaining System
vertices and one edge. This represents a network of two mobile nodes, Alice and Bob, with one
certiﬁcate that Bob issued to Alice. The conﬁdence value 0.8 is assigned by Bob showing the level
of trust Bob has in Alice. A more complex TRG from a typical certiﬁcate chaining system looks like
Figure 4.6 where many certiﬁcates populate the TRG. It is important to note that each client node
in a network may have a diﬀerently shaped local TRG based on their observations and knowledge,
which intuitively maps to diﬀerent end users having diﬀerent views about other users. As a client
node collects more information and the local TRG contains more information, the end user can put
higher conﬁdence on the authentication result. We discuss this issue in detail in Section 4.2.2.
We propose the idea of extending this trust graph model to include trusted third parties, such
as certiﬁcate authorities [YK04b]. Trust graphs for such systems generally look like Figure 4.7.
For distributed CA approaches, the CA node in the graph represents the collection of nodes that
comprises the distributed CA. Every node in the network trusts the CA as the trust anchor for the
whole network. Since the conﬁdence in authentication from a CA-based system solely depends on
the security and reliability of the CA, users should be able to express their own perception about
the security and reliability of the CA.
In the remainder of this section, we elaborate further on the CA security level metric. We
deﬁne the CA’s security level as the probability that an adversary can compromise the CA. This
probability can be calculated from the conﬁguration parameters of the distributed CA, including
the total number of nodes in the network, M, the number of CA nodes, n, and the crypto threshold,
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k (1 ≤ k ≤ n ≤ M). In addition, each end user must provide the ﬁnal parameter, c, the capacity of
the attacker(s), which represents a simple threat model: there is one or more active and colluding
attackers at a given point of time and they are capable of compromising at most c mobile nodes.
If there are multiple independent attackers that do not cooperate with each other, each attacker
must be given diﬀerent c values depending on their capability. Each end user must estimate c
based on their perception of network conditions and the behavior of the distributed CA. If c < k,
the threshold cryptography protects the distributed CA from being compromised. However, if
c ≥ k, the adversaries could compromise enough nodes to break the threshold cryptography. If
the adversaries are capable of pinpointing the attacks on only the CA nodes, the framework is
always compromised as long as c ≥ k. However, if the adversaries does not know the locations or
the identities of the n CA nodes, the best approach is to compromise as many nodes as possible,
hoping that it will allow them to compromise at least k CA nodes, therefore compromising the
distributed CA. Given these assumptions, the security level of a distributed CA can be calculated
as:
CA Security Level = 1.0−
∑c
i=k
(
n
i
)(
M−n
c−i
)
(
M
c
) . (4.1)
The second component of this equation captures the probability that a distributed CA is com-
promised by an attacker with an attack capacity c. The denominator,
(
M
c
)
, is the number of all
possible cases where the attacker compromises any c nodes in a M-node network. The numerator
counts the number of cases where the attacker successfully compromises the distributed CA by
compromising k or more CA nodes (
(
n
i
)
) and the rest from non-CA nodes (
(
M−n
c−i
)
). Hence, this
second component represents the probability that an attacker can compromise a distributed PKI by
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compromising c mobile nodes. Therefore, Equation 4.1 captures the probability that the attacker
fails to compromise the CA or the CA resists the attack, and so represents the CA’s security level.
Next, we present our Situation-Aware Metrics of Authentication that are used to calculate the
QoA based on the TRG model presented in this section and the relevant situational information.
4.2.2 Metrics of Authentication
Quality of Authentication (QoA) can be loosely deﬁned as the level of conﬁdence that can be put
on an instance of authentication based on the current knowledge about the situation of the au-
thentication service. Once the trust relationships among the nodes are captured, the QoA of each
authentication instance can be calculated using Metrics of Authentication (MoA) that capture the
eﬀects of the current situational parameters. Given a trust relationship graph of the network, TRG,
the authenticating node, a, and the target node, t, a function QoA(TRG, a, t) returns a numeric
value that represents the amount of trust the authenticating node has in the authentication of the
target node. The design of our MoA is based on a large body of previous research in authenti-
cation metrics [BBK94, BLNS86, Jos99, Ken93, LA98, Mau96, MT03, RS99, TH92, Zim95]. Our
contributions include (1) a novel way to measure the security level of distributed PKI approaches,
(2) a clean and intuitive method to combine multiple observations in an authentication process,
and (3) integration of situational information into the QoA measurement. In the remainder of this
section, we ﬁrst brieﬂy compare two diﬀerent types of authentication supported in our MoA and
then describe how to evaluate the QoA in detail.
Direct vs. Indirect Authentication
Since authentication can come from many diﬀerent sources, it is important to distinguish between
two types of authentication: direct and indirect. A direct authentication is achieved when the au-
thenticating node or the trusted third party has a direct trust relationship with the target node
(i.e., the target node possesses a certiﬁcate issued by either the authenticating node or the trusted
third party). An indirect authentication is achieved via a chain of certiﬁcates that originates at the
authenticating node or the trusted third party and ends at the target node. Indirect authentication
relies on the concept of transitive trust and is inherently less trustworthy than direct authentication
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due to its reliance on other nodes that the authenticating node does not have a direct trust rela-
tionship with. Therefore, it is intuitive to favor trust from direct authentication over any indirect
authentication. QoA for a direct authentication is deﬁned as the conﬁdence value of the certiﬁcate
issued to the target:
QoA(TRG, a, t) = c(ei),where ei = (a, t), ei ∈ E.
When it is not possible to directly authenticate the target, the authenticating node bases its
decision on a combination of all possible indirect authentications from the TRG.
Calculating the Chain Conﬁdence Value for a Single Chain
Given a certiﬁcate chain, there is a single Chain Conﬁdence Value (CCV) that is calculated from
the edge conﬁdence values and the length of the chain. First, edge conﬁdence values of all of the
edges in the chain are multiplied. Then, an attenuation factor is multiplied to discourage the use
of longer chains. Let ei be the edges in the chain ci, c(ei) be the conﬁdence value of ei, p be the
probability of a node being compromised, and d be the length of the chain. The CCV is calculated
as follows:
CCV (ci) =
∏
ei
c(ei) ∗ (1− p)(d−1). (4.2)
Considering that the validity of a certiﬁcate chain relies on the correctness of every participating
node, it is intuitive to see that a long certiﬁcate chain is more vulnerable and its use should be
discouraged if a shorter alternate is available. If we assume that each node in the network is equally
likely to be malicious or be compromised with a probability p, the probability that a chain of length
d is intact can be denoted as (1−p)(d−1) (not (1−p)d since the ﬁrst hop is from a trusted node). To
accommodate this observation, the result from the multiplication of edge conﬁdence values is again
multiplied by the attenuation factor, (1− p)(d−1). This attenuation factor decreases exponentially
as the chain length grows, which eﬀectively discourages the use of long chains. The use of this user-
tunable parameter p is a case of using situation-aware information in QoA measurement where the
end user’s perception of the network condition (i.e., the fraction of compromised nodes) aﬀects the
ﬁnal QoA value. An end user can exercise various methods to collect the information about network
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conditions to determine the appropriate p value. If the network is equipped with intrusion detection
capability, the monitored network behavior can be provided to end users for their determination
of p. An end user can also collect other trusted nodes’ opinions on network status and aggregate
such opinions to form a collective output of the p value. Exact semantics of determining p is left
to each instance of network deployment and available support functionalities.
When the discovered chain originates from a trusted third party instead of from the authenti-
cating node, the trusted third party’s security level, as calculated in Section 4.2.1, is multiplied to
get the ﬁnal CCV:
CCV (ci) =
∏
ei
c(ei) ∗ (1− p)(d−1) ∗ CA Security Level. (4.3)
Pitfalls of Using a Single Certiﬁcate Chain
Other than the intuitive reason that using all available information enables the authenticator to
reach a more informed decision, using a single certiﬁcate chain for authentication has one serious
ﬂaw. Reiter and Stubblebine ﬁrst pointed out that it is trivial to manipulate the conﬁdence values in
a single chain since the attacker can simply issue many bogus certiﬁcates [RS99]. Reiter proposed
using multiple chains that exist in the authenticator’s local TRG with one restriction. Simply
accommodating all chains in a TRG is again vulnerable to attacks from a small number of malicious
nodes since they can issue any number of bogus certiﬁcates and it is trivial to aﬀect many certiﬁcate
chains. Reiter then suggested the use of node-disjoint chains only. In that way, the impact any
one malicious node can have on the ﬁnal result is limited to a single chain where the particular
malicious node is included. As long as there are enough chains in the trust relationship graph,
the eﬀect of a small number of malicious nodes can be eﬀectively masked. In our study, we follow
Reiter’s guideline and also limit the certiﬁcate chains to be node-disjoint from one another. Once a
set of node-disjoint certiﬁcate chains are identiﬁed and their individual CCVs calculated, the next
question is how to combine these individual CCVs into a single, meaningful yet concise result. We
use results from a research area in philosophy that tries to model the human behavior of reasoning.
More speciﬁcally we use the wisdom from an area called Scientiﬁc Conﬁrmation Theory [Car50].
If multiple chains exist between two nodes, it is beneﬁcial to leverage information from all chains
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to make a more informed decision about the trustworthiness of a particular node, increasing the
accuracy of the calculated QoA. Therefore, the ﬁnal QoA should be a function of the CCVs for
the multiple chains. There are a small number of results from the research community on this
matter. Reiter and Stubblebine proposed to treat multiple certiﬁcate chains as a set of network
paths with respective capacity and use the maximum network ﬂow as the quality of authentica-
tion result [RS99]. Jiang et al. proposed to use the detection of conﬂicting chains, which are
a set of chains with conﬂicting opinions about a single target, to improve the robustness of the
authentication decision [JRN]. While both approaches essentially try to achieve the same goal, the
combination of the opinions from multiple certiﬁcate chains without getting manipulated easily by
adversaries, neither completely achieves the goal. Reiter’s approach eventually shifted the burden
to an external insurance system where the value of the maximum network ﬂow is matched to a
monetary insurance each intermediate node is willing to vouch for. Jiang’s approach solves some
unanswered questions from the previous results but still does not provide a comprehensive solution
and strong justiﬁcation behind their approach.
The biggest challenge we encountered is that this particular situation does not satisfy the
requirements for the application of traditional Bayesian statistics. Since the authenticator has no
way to know how many total certiﬁcate chains may exist in the global TRG, traditional Bayesian
statistics cannot be applied. Therefore, we turn to a broader area of study in human reasoning and
adopt results from the area called Scientiﬁc Conﬁrmation Theory [Car50]. Scientiﬁc Conﬁrmation
Theory is an area of study to model the reasoning behavior of humans. It deals with the situation
where the assumptions of the traditional Bayesian statistics are not satisﬁed as in our case. A
famous example of the Raven’s Paradox and other details of scientiﬁc conﬁrmation theory can be
found in the [Car50, Mah93].
Combining Opinions from Multiple Certiﬁcate Chains
Our metric follows Reiter’s suggestion [RS98] and considers only a set of node-disjoint certiﬁcate
chains. Given a certiﬁcation graph, there may be many ways to select a set of node-disjoint chains
that have the same end nodes. It has been shown that the problem of ﬁnding all node-disjoint
paths in a mesh graph is NP-hard [AKW96]. Reiter and Stubblebine also report on the diﬃculty
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Autenticator Target
Opinions (CCV from each chain)
Figure 4.8: Combining Multiple Opinions
of enforcing the node-disjoint property on chain discovery. Therefore, we employ a simple greedy
approach for chain discovery. The authenticating node, a, discovers any certiﬁcate chain from either
itself or the trusted third party (if available) to the target node, t, in the local TRG. Finding a single
certiﬁcate chain can be achieved by running a breadth-ﬁrst search algorithm on the TRG. We use
Dijkstra’s algorithm to ﬁnd the shortest chains available [Dij59]. After calculating the conﬁdence
value of the discovered chain, a removes the intermediate nodes of the chain from the local TRG
and repeats this process until there are no more chains linking a and t. The conﬁdence values from
all discovered chains are collected and then combined into a single ﬁnal QoA value at the end of
the process. In the remainder of this section, the QoA calculation for each indirect authentication
instance is presented in detail, as well as how these individual QoA results can be combined into a
ﬁnal QoA.
CCVs from each chain are considered an Opinion that the authenticator has about the target.
Essentially, the authenticator has multiple opinions about a single target with the help of multiple
disjoint sets of entities, as visualized in Figure 4.8.
To combine these potentially disagreeing opinions, our metric has two main steps. First, the
CCVs from the chains must be combined. Second, the quality of the evidence given must be
factored into the ﬁnal decision of what QoA to assign to the target.
Given a number of CCVs, one per chain, the value of the mean (µ) is calculated according to
Equation 4.4, where n is the number of chains.
µ =
∑
CCV
n
. (4.4)
The probability that an accurate QoA is established by the mean depends not only on the
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sample size, but also in the variance between CCVs in the sample. Any CCVs that are far outside
the mean skew the result. To avoid the potential of malicious nodes skewing the QoA by injecting
a CCV at either end of the spectrum, a conﬁdence interval is used to eliminate widely varying
values. First, the sum of squares is calculated according to Equation 4.5. Then, using this value,
the standard deviation (σ) is obtained according to Equation 4.6.
∑
d2 =
∑
CCV 2 − (
∑
CCV )2
n
. (4.5)
σ =
√∑
d2
n− 1 . (4.6)
Finally, any CCV values outside two standard deviations away from the mean are removed from
the sample and µ is recalculated using the new sample using Equation 4.4.
Next, the level of conﬁdence in the value of µ based on the sample size is taken into account.
Intuitively, a larger number of chains should yield a higher conﬁdence in µ than a lower number of
chains. Standard statistical methods for calculating the probability that µ is correct assuming that
the number of possible samples is known ahead of time [Mah93]. In other words, if the possible
number of samples is 100, we could calculate the probability that µ is correct given 40 chains.
However, the number of possible chains cannot be not known due to the dynamic nature of ad
hoc networks, barring us from using the standard statistical methods. To solve this problem, we
turn to insights gained from the study of Scientiﬁc Conﬁrmation Theory, an area of inductive
logic [Car50, Mah93]. Essentially, we can think of the problem in the following way. Given a set of
the n CCV values, we want to make a hypothesis about what the actual conﬁdence value should
be based on these evidences. Using a standard approach in scientiﬁc conﬁrmation theory, we use
Equation 4.7 to give the conﬁdence factor (ω), where n is the number of reporting chains.
ω =
n
n + 1
. (4.7)
Essentially, ω captures the level of conﬁdence in the value of µ given the fact that n chains are
being used for the calculation. The intuition behind Equation 4.7 is that the conﬁdence in two
chains should be signiﬁcantly higher than the conﬁdence in only one chain. However, the increase
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in conﬁdence from 99 chains to 100 chains should be quite small. This intuition is captured in the
conﬁdence factor ω by doubling ω from one to two chains, but only increasing ω by 1100 from 99 to
100 chains. Essentially, a low ω represents a low conﬁdence in µ.
Once ω is determined from the sample size, it must be applied to µ to yield the ﬁnal QoA. To
control the impact of ω on µ, we introduce a weighting parameter γ as follows:
QoA = [(µ× γ)× ω] + [µ× (1− γ)]. (4.8)
Essentially, γ (0.0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.0), captures how much impact ω should have on µ by putting a cap
on ω’s range of impact on µ. The ﬁrst term of this equation represents the portion of µ adjusted
using γ, while the second term represents the unaﬀected portion of µ. For example, with γ = 1.0, ω
is fully applied to the whole µ with maximum eﬀect. If γ = 0.5, ω is only applied to 50% of µ and
the eﬀect is halved. When the sample size is very large, a small number of samples implies very
incomplete knowledge. However, when the sample size is very small, a small number of samples
still implies reasonably complete knowledge. Therefore, for a large sample size, (e.g., 1,000), the
value of γ should be high. However, for a small sample size, (e.g., 10), the value of γ should be
low. Once a ﬁnal QoA has been calculated, the end user can decide whether or not to accept the
authentication or reject it.
In the following three chapters, we present two novel situation-aware ad hoc key management
frameworks: MOCA distributed PKI and Composite Key Management, followed by an extensive
comparison study of existing ad hoc key management frameworks including our own.
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Chapter 5
MOCA: A Secure Distributed PKI
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [KP] is a well-established approach for digital certiﬁcate man-
agement. PKI was originally designed around a centralized and trusted component called the
Certiﬁcate Authority (CA), which binds and unbinds entities to their public keys by issuing and
revoking digital certiﬁcates, and also functions as the repository for active digital certiﬁcates. Well-
known examples of certiﬁcate authorities for the Internet include Verisign [Ver], Thawte [Tha] and
Entrust [Ent]. However, it is questionable if the traditional centralized CA-based PKI is directly
applicable to ad hoc networks, where diﬀerent characteristics invalidate many assumptions that
traditional PKI relies on. First, nodes in an ad hoc network are more vulnerable compared to
wired hosts. Second, network topology and connectivity can rapidly change in ad hoc networks
due to the mobility of nodes and the use of a wireless medium, making it diﬃcult to maintain the
availability of a mobile CA. Therefore, an ad hoc PKI must be designed to operate under these
unique conditions.
To address the challenges of ad hoc environments, the CA’s functionality can be distributed
to multiple nodes in such a manner that the CA stays secure even when some portion of the
responsible nodes are compromised or become unavailable [ZH99]. Most approaches in this direction
rely on a cryptographic technique called threshold cryptography [FD92]. However, there is an
inherent tension between the two most important goals of a distributed CA: strong security and
high availability. Careless focus on strong security can easily make the CA unavailable or too costly
to be maintained. Similarly, a blind eﬀort to increase the availability of a distributed CA can easily
lead to a security breach of the CA. Therefore, an ad hoc key management framework must be
designed as a comprehensive system addressing all of the challenges in a uniﬁed framework.
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The contribution of our work in this chapter is the design and implementation of the MOCA
(MObile Certiﬁcate Authority) ad hoc key management framework. MOCA uses threshold cryptog-
raphy to distribute the CA functionality to multiple nodes. MOCA diﬀers from other distributed
CA approaches for ad hoc networks by limiting MOCA nodes to a small but more secure subset
of the nodes in an ad hoc network. The distributed CA is then made available with novel com-
munication support designed for the unique pattern that arises from the access to any threshold
quorum system. These novel design characteristics enable MOCA to simultaneously provide strong
security and high availability. MOCA is equipped with its situation-aware component that uses a
novel combinatorial metric to measure the changing security level of distributed PKI so that the
users of the service can adequately adapt to changing situations.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We ﬁrst discuss the threat model used in
the design of the MOCA framework. Section 5.2 describes the MOCA framework in detail. In
Section 5.3, we present our novel manycast routing protocol that enables MOCA to be eﬃcient
while maintaining strong security. We then analyze the security of the MOCA framework with
our novel security metric in Section 5.4. In Section 5.5, the eﬃciency of communication support
in the MOCA framework is illustrated with an extensive simulation study and we summarize the
contributions in Section 5.6.
5.1 MOCA Threat Model
The threats that can exist in an ad hoc network must drive the design of a key management
framework for ad hoc networks. Attacks can be classiﬁed into two categories: active and passive.
Active attacks involve behaviors such as manipulating packets, attacking other mobile nodes, or
jamming the wireless medium. Passive attacks only rely on overhearing the traﬃc without dis-
rupting network operation. Passive attacks are harder to detect compared to active attacks with
visible anomalies. We focus our attention on two active attacks on a distributed PKI: Routing layer
attacks and Directed attacks on CA nodes.
• Routing Layer Attacks - Malicious nodes can disrupt routing behavior by advertising false
routing information, injecting incorrect routing packets, or even luring all packets and drop-
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ping them [AHNRR02, HPJ03a, HPJ03b, K. 02, YNK02]. Some routing layer attacks can be
used to mount a simple denial-of-service attack if the attacker can either block or reroute all
of the victim’s packets. The MOCA framework uses a set of routing protocols based on the
intelligent use of limited ﬂooding that are immune to most routing layer attacks.
• Directed Attacks on CA nodes - When the attacker can discover either the identity or the
location of CA nodes, the attacker can focus its resources on only attacking the CA nodes.
The MOCA framework is designed to minimize the possibility of the CA nodes getting com-
promised. MOCA nodes are only selected from more secure and capable nodes and their
identities are hidden so that an adversary cannot direct an attack on the MOCA nodes.
Radio frequency jamming is an active attack mounted at the physical layer of the network where
an attacker transmits a high power signal over the spectrum, eﬀectively jamming the band. This
is a low-level denial-of-service attack and defense against it is out of scope of this study.
Passive attacks include eavesdropping and traﬃc analysis. The MOCA framework is not vul-
nerable to eavesdropping since all information contained in communication between a client and
the MOCA framework is public. On the other hand, traﬃc analysis may provide the attackers with
sensitive information about the conﬁguration of the framework. However, it is unclear how feasible
a traﬃc analysis attack can be in ad hoc environments since traﬃc analysis requires a large amount
of the attackers’ resources [JVZ00]. While there are known approaches to deter traﬃc analysis
in wired networks [DMS04, RR98], it is questionable if any of these approaches can be directly
applied to ad hoc environments due to their excessive communication and computation overhead.
Therefore, the design of our MOCA framework focuses on the two speciﬁed active attacks. Based
on this threat model, we next present a set of requirements for eﬀective ad hoc key management
frameworks and examine existing approaches based on these criteria.
5.2 MOCA
In this section, we present the MOCA (MObile Certiﬁcate Authority) ad hoc key management
framework. MOCA uses threshold cryptography to divide and distribute the CA functionality to
multiple nodes. MOCA nodes are picked carefully based on their characteristics such as physical
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security, computational capability, and trustworthiness. Based on these criteria, a relatively small
set of nodes is selected to function as the distributed CA. These MOCA nodes operate in the
network without revealing their identity as the CA nodes. Careful MOCA node selection and
anonymity help achieve a high level of security for the MOCA framework. Usually, the price for
having a small set of CA nodes is reduced availability and higher communication overhead. MOCA
addresses this problem by employing a suite of specially designed routing protocols for eﬃcient
communication support for the certiﬁcation traﬃc.
5.2.1 Using Threshold Cryptography
MOCA employs k-out-of-n threshold cryptosystem to divide the CA’s master private key to n
distributed CA nodes [FD92, Sho00]. The CA’s master private key is divided into n pieces and
any k of these pieces can be used to reconstruct the master private key. There are three important
factors to consider when employing threshold cryptography: (1) Who will be given a secret share?
(2) Who will distribute the secret shares? And, (3) How to handle compromised secret share
holders? Next, we discuss each of these questions in detail.
Choice of MOCA Nodes
Any number of nodes between one and the total number of nodes in the network can be selected as
MOCA nodes. However, selecting a relatively small fraction of nodes in the network is desirable.
Intuitively, the crypto threshold k cannot be set too high since it causes every certiﬁcation request
to generate excessive communication overhead. With the crypto threshold value ﬁxed, increasing
the number of MOCA nodes widens the gap between k and n, allowing attackers to more easily
locate enough MOCA nodes to compromise and steal the master private key. Therefore, n must be
kept to a relatively small value compared to the total number of nodes in the network.
There are many possible ways to select the MOCA nodes. While most research in ad hoc net-
working has implicitly treated all nodes to be identical, it is more likely that an ad hoc network
contains several types of mobile nodes that are diﬀerent from one another in power capacity, trans-
mission range, computational capacity, and security. Therefore, any security service or framework
should utilize this potential heterogeneity. For example, consider a battleﬁeld scenario with a battle
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group consisting of infantry soldiers, platoon commanders’ jeeps, company commanders’ command
vehicles, artillery vehicles, transport vehicles, and tanks. All of these mobile nodes have diﬀerent
rank, power, computation capacity, transmission range, and level of physical security. In such a
case, it would be wise to pick nodes with higher ranks, more power, more capabilities and stronger
security to provide a security service. While it may not be necessary to exploit this potential het-
erogeneity to enhance basic ad hoc routing, certainly this heterogeneity can be used to help improve
network security by endowing more secure nodes with sensitive information. Similar situations can
be imagined in emergency rescue operations, disaster recovery, or any other scenario where ad hoc
networks can play a critical role. In general, knowledge of such heterogeneity should be used to
determine the nodes that share the responsibility of the CA. Once the number of MOCA nodes,
n, is chosen, the MOCA framework selects n mobile nodes with (1) highest trustworthiness, (2)
highest physical security, (3) most computational capacity, and (4) most power as MOCA nodes.
Once the MOCA nodes are selected, their identity must be kept secret. Maintaining the
anonymity of MOCA nodes is crucial to achieve strong security. Intuitively, it is harder, if not
impossible, for an adversary to locate anonymous MOCA nodes and compromise them. This forces
the adversary to invest far more resources trying to compromise the key management framework
and reduces the chance for successful attacks. We have previously proposed an anonymous com-
munication protocol for ubiquitous environments called Mist [AMCK+02]. Mist provides location
privacy for communicating peers through support at the routing layer. Our approach for anony-
mous communication support in MOCA shares this design point and is designed as a routing layer
solution. With routing layer support for anonymous communication and careful design of protocol
message content, the MOCA framework provides certiﬁcation service anonymously. A traﬃc anal-
ysis attack by a very powerful attacker may guess the identity of some MOCA nodes. However,
due to the choice of MOCA nodes and the anonymous routing support, the attacker’s guess cannot
be veriﬁed and the anonymity of the MOCA framework only degrades a little.
Oﬀ-line Key Dealer
Once a set of nodes is selected to serve as MOCA nodes, the nodes are conﬁgured by an oﬀ-line key
dealer that does not participate in the ad hoc network operation. The oﬀ-line key dealer generates
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the CA’s master key pair, divides the private key using threshold cryptography, distributes the key
shares to selected MOCA nodes and then goes oﬄine and stays out of the network. This oﬀ-line
key dealer is a crucial component to the framework’s overall security since it holds the full secret
key of the CA. Therefore, it is critical to protect the oﬀ-line key dealer from attackers.
Alternative approaches that do not require such an oﬀ-line key dealer use online election of CA
nodes. Such online election can be performed when more than a threshold number of CA nodes
become disabled or there is a network conﬁguration change. Kong et al. uses online election to make
the distributed CA self-contained within an ad hoc network [KZL+01]. In their approach, a group
of neighboring nodes can promote another node to become a CA node with a proper key share.
However, this design decision opens the door for a serious security breach since it is relatively easy
to compromise enough nodes to steer the online CA election to beneﬁt attackers. Also, given the
problem of Sybil attacks, it is impossible to prevent impersonation in an open distributed system
without clearly distinguished centralized authentication support [Dou00]. Therefore, Kong et al.’s
proposal is also open to Sybil attacks where an adversary node may acquire multiple identities to
impersonate enough nodes to acquire key shares and reconstruct the CA’s full private key, resulting
in the total compromise of the framework. Defense against Sybil attacks in ad hoc networks is still
an open research problem [NSSP04]. Therefore, MOCA does not allow online election of new CA
nodes in the interest of maintaining strong security.
5.2.2 Message Format
Hiding the identity of the MOCA nodes is another important factor for strong security. It is also
crucial that no message exchanged between a client and the MOCA nodes carry any identifying
information about the MOCA nodes. There are two types of messages that can be exchanged
between the MOCA framework and client nodes: certiﬁcation requests from a client and certiﬁcation
replies to a client. All messages are designed so that the identities of MOCA nodes can stay hidden.
Certiﬁcation Request (CREQ)
A certiﬁcation request message is sent from a client node to a group of MOCA nodes. All MOCA
nodes that receive the request message must reply accordingly. A certiﬁcation request message
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contains the following information.
1. Client ID - the ID of the client node
2. Type - A certiﬁcate request, a revocation request, or a certiﬁcate retrieval request.
3. Payload - A certiﬁcation request contains the public key of the requesting node. A revocation
request contains the public key of the requesting node. A certiﬁcate retrieval request contains
the ID of a node whose certiﬁcate is being requested.
4. Signature - The whole certiﬁcation request message is signed with the requesting node’s
private key. Note that this key may not yet be certiﬁed at this point.
Certiﬁcation Reply (CREP)
When a MOCA node receives a certiﬁcation request message from a client, it returns a certiﬁcation
reply message containing the following information.
1. Client ID - The ID of the requesting node
2. Payload - For a certiﬁcation request, a partial signature over the digital certiﬁcate is sent back.
For a revocation request, a revocation certiﬁcate is created and sent back. For a certiﬁcate
retrieval request, a digital certiﬁcate is sent back if available at the MOCA node.
Note that a CREP message does not contain any information about the replying MOCA node
to keep them anonymous.
5.3 Manycast Communication Support for the Certiﬁcation
Traﬃc
The design decision to limit the number of MOCA nodes in a network creates a challenge for
availability. Since there are a limited number of MOCA nodes to choose from, a client node
may have diﬃculty contacting enough MOCA nodes. Without any attention, this can also easily
put excessive communication overhead on the network while causing network-wide congestion and
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wasting the scarce resources of mobile nodes. The key idea of our solution lies in the observation
of a novel communication pattern generated by the MOCA framework. When a client contacts
a set of MOCA nodes for a certiﬁcation service, it generates a communication pattern of one-
to-many-to-one. The client needs to contact k MOCA nodes and must receive k independent
replies. We named this communication pattern manycast and performed an extensive study of its
characteristics [CYRK03].
Essentially, manycast is a group communication paradigm in which one client communicates
simultaneously with some threshold number of servers from the members of a group. Manycast
provides a unique communication challenge. As in anycast, the ideal set of receivers for a partic-
ular transmission varies according to its source. In fact, both anycast and multicast are special
cases of manycast communication. To support service-oriented communication, manycast should
enable eﬃcient short transactional request/response communication between clients and servers, in
addition to a one-way dissemination of data as in IP multicast. Due to the dynamic nature of ad
hoc networks, the eﬃcient support of this bidirectional one-to-many-to-one communication requires
implementation in the network layer.
Figure 5.1: Example Ad Hoc Network
To provide a clear description of the manycast approaches, we deﬁne some necessary terminology
and a simple graphical representation of communication patterns. Just as with unicast routing
protocols, there are two phases to the routing process. In the discovery phase, the source has
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no knowledge about the network and the targets of a transmission. In the delivery phase, the
source has previously discovered something about the topology of the network and tries to use that
knowledge to perform more eﬃcient delivery than what is possible in the discovery phase. When
the network knowledge is no longer useful, e.g., due to a link break, the routing process moves from
delivery back into the discovery phase. We illustrate the operation of each approach using the ad
hoc network of 28 nodes in Figure 5.1. This network supports a manycast application with one
client node, the hatched node labeled C, and 11 servers, the white nodes labeled S. The goal for
this application is to reach 3 servers with each manycast transaction. The dashed lines between
nodes indicate connectivity. We indicate request and relay transmissions (those that deliver the
request to servers) as thick, lightly shaded directed edges. Transmissions that carry the response
message back to the client are depicted as narrower, darker directed edges. A depiction of these
edge styles illustrates the representation:
When a transmission is sent in both directions across a link during the course of a scenario,
we remove the arrowheads and draw a single undirected edge between the two nodes. We indicate
broadcast transmissions with multiple outgoing edges from the same node. The description in the
text clearly diﬀerentiates whether multiple outgoing edges indicate a single broadcast transmission
or several unicast transmissions.
An ideal manycast delivery has no discovery phase and requires the smallest possible number
of transmissions to perform a transaction. For the example network, an ideal manycast delivery
is presented in Figure 5.2. This delivery reaches exactly 3 servers. All transmissions, with the
exception of the original request, are unicast.
When designing a protocol to support manycast communication, there are two questions to
answer: (1) How to choose and contact k nodes from the set of n without knowing their individual
identities? And (2) What is the most eﬃcient way to contact and receive individual replies from
them? Among the suite of manycast routing protocols proposed in [CYRK03], only two are appro-
priate for the MOCA framework: ﬂooding and scoped-ﬂooding, since only these two approaches can
maintain the servers’ anonymity.
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Figure 5.2: Ideal Manycast
A client without any knowledge about the network or MOCA nodes must ﬂood a certiﬁcation
request (CREQ) the ﬁrst time. Every MOCA node that receives the CREQ replies with a cer-
tiﬁcation reply (CREP) generated with their secret share. A CREP message is unicast back to
the client using the reverse path created by the CREQ message. When a client receives CREP
messages, the client records the hopcount of each reply. These hopcounts show the distance be-
tween the client and the MOCA node that sent the reply messages. When the client needs to
send the next CREQ message, the information in this hopcount cache is ﬁrst examined to ﬁnd out
whether it is possible to reduce the scope of ﬂooding controlled by the TTL (Time-To-Live) ﬁeld
in the CREQ message while reaching enough MOCA nodes. With scoped ﬂooding, the MOCA
framework achieves highly eﬃcient communication support for certiﬁcation traﬃc while keeping
the MOCA nodes secure and anonymous. A detailed performance study of manycast routing in
the MOCA framework is presented in Section 5.5.
5.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we examine the security of the MOCA framework. Threshold cryptography used
to distribute the CA functionality has built-in support for security and fault tolerance. More
speciﬁcally, an adversary must compromise at least k MOCA nodes to compromise the CA. As
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long as there are k non-faulty MOCA nodes in operation, the framework can provide service.
However, deployment of a distributed CA with threshold cryptography requires careful attention
to ﬁner details. We ﬁrst examine the basic parameters and their relationship to the security of the
framework and then discuss some additional precautions required for secure deployment.
5.4.1 Threshold Cryptography Parameters
The conﬁguration of the MOCA framework is determined by the total number of nodes in the
network, M, the crypto threshold for secret reconstruction, k, and the number of MOCA nodes, n.
While M cannot be chosen a priori, the crypto threshold, k, can be selected and it is important
to understand the eﬀects of the selected value of k. k can be chosen between 1 (a single MOCA
node must be contacted for a certiﬁcation service) and n (all MOCA nodes must be contacted for
a certiﬁcation service). Setting k to a higher value has the eﬀect of making the system more secure
since k is the number of MOCA nodes an adversary needs to compromise to penetrate the system.
But at the same time, a higher k value makes clients contact more MOCA nodes for certiﬁcation
service, which may result in higher communication overhead. Therefore, the choice of k must strike
a balance between the two conﬂicting goals by being small enough to not overwhelm the network
but large enough to withstand attacks.
The number of MOCA nodes, n, is determined by the characteristics of the nodes in the network
and is determined before the MOCA framework is deployed. n can be changed to a new value but
it requires costly intervention of the oﬀ-line key dealer. In a threshold system, n deﬁnes the limits
of the system as an upper bound for k since 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Given a ﬁxed value of k, a larger n increases
the availability of the whole framework since a client can choose from a larger set of MOCA nodes.
On the other hand, (n - k) is the maximum number of faults the framework can survive, so a larger
n also means higher fault tolerance.
5.4.2 Measuring the Security Level for Distributed CAs
In this section, we brieﬂy present the metric for CA’s security level from Section 4.2.1 and analyze
general distributed PKIs using the metric Assuming the distributed CA nodes are anonymous and
an adversary cannot discover their identity, the best approach for the adversary is to compromise
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as many nodes as possible in a given amount of time, hoping that enough CA nodes are included
among the compromised nodes. The following simple combinatoric equation captures this situation.
Security Level = 1.0−
∑c
i=k
(
n
i
)(
M−n
c−i
)
(
M
c
) ,
This formula measures the probability that an attacker fails to compromise the distributed CA
given that the attacker can compromise at most c nodes in a window of time. If an attacker is
capable of pinpointing attacks only on the CA nodes, the attack always succeeds as long as c ≥ k.
Therefore, it is crucial to keep the CA nodes anonymous, limiting attackers to random attacks.
Currently, there are only two concrete designs proposed for distributed CAs [KZL+01, YK03].
In Kong’s approach, every node serves as a CA node. Therefore, it is impossible to hide the
identities of CA nodes and application of this metric always yields a zero security level as long as
c ≥ k. In contrast, MOCA hides the CA nodes’ identities as well as limits their number. Therefore,
the best chance an adversary has to compromise the system is by randomly compromising as many
nodes as possible. For example, the security level of a 30-node MOCA framework with k = 5 and
c = 10 in a 150-node network is calculated to 0.97, which shows that it is not very likely that this
conﬁguration of the MOCA framework will be compromised.
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Figure 5.3: Security Level with Varying Number of MOCA Nodes n (it k=10)
This metric also reveals another important conﬁguration pitfall that can be easily overlooked:
the meaning of the gap between k and n. Based on the discussions so far, a large enough k and much
larger n appear to be the right choice for conﬁguration parameters. However, if the gap between
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k and n is too big, the security of the framework degrades. If c < k, the framework is secure by
design since no adversary can compromise enough MOCA nodes. However, if c ≥ k, it is possible
for an adversary to compromise the framework. Therefore, it helps to limit the MOCA nodes to
be a small set of more secure and capable nodes, which makes it harder for the adversary to locate
and compromise enough MOCA nodes. Figure 5.3 illustrates one example. Out of 150 total nodes
in the network, 10, 30, 50, 100, and 120 nodes are selected as MOCA nodes with a ﬁxed crypto
threshold k = 10. The ﬁve curves in the graph display cases of n = 120, 100, 50, 30, and 10 from
left to right. As the attacker’s capacity c increases, all curves monotonically decrease from 1.0 to
0.0. However, the rate of decrease is much higher for curves with a larger n. This illustrates the
eﬀect of the gap between k and n, which shows that a too large n can weaken the conﬁguration of
the overall framework.
This metric introduces a new burden on end users who must apply this metric to measure the
security of distributed CAs. Each end user must be able to determine an adequate c value for the
attacker(s)’s capacity under changing network condition. End users can collect relevant information
from available support facilities such as intrusion detection systems or any other monitoring service
provided by network operators and also use his own perception on the network conditions to
determine the adequate c value. Therefore, end users can have diﬀerent c values based on their
own perceptions. However, determining the accurate value of c under changing network condition
is still an open research problem that we plan to investigate in the future.
5.4.3 Selection of MOCA nodes
As discussed in the previous section, the number of MOCA nodes, n, in a network should be limited
to a reasonable number. It may seem counterintuitive to limit the number of MOCA nodes, which
may reduce the availability and the fault tolerance achieved by the distributed nature of MOCA.
For example, in a 300 node network, an operator may have a choice of selecting 200 random nodes or
30 nodes with higher physical security to support CA functionality. Blindly comparing the number
of MOCA nodes in the system, the ﬁrst choice seems better because it has more MOCA nodes in
the network, improving fault tolerance and availability. However, by guaranteeing a higher level
of security of the 30 MOCA nodes in the second case, compromising them becomes much harder
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than compromising the randomly selected MOCA nodes in the ﬁrst case, hence making the second
case more secure against adversaries. It is possible that an ad hoc network does not have enough
heterogeneity among the nodes, which may make it diﬃcult, if not impossible, to choose MOCA
nodes based on heterogeneity. In such cases, we can fall back to random selection of MOCA nodes.
However, the level of security will decrease since there is no guarantee on the security of each
MOCA node.
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The next question is how to pick the best subset of nodes to serve as the MOCA nodes. As
discussed in Section 5.2.1, MOCA nodes are selected based on their characteristics and limited
to more secure, more capable, and more trustworthy nodes. This design decision makes it more
diﬃcult for an adversary to compromise the MOCA framework, in eﬀect decreasing the adversary’s
attack capacity c. Figure 5.4 illustrates an example. The three curves display the security levels
for the conﬁgurations with c = 50, 30, and 20. The horizontal line at the security level 1.0 is for
the case of c = 5, where the framework is completely secure since c < k. The curves move to the
right as the adversary’s attack capacity is decreased, making the system more secure. A careful
selection of MOCA nodes can indeed help maintain a higher security level.
5.4.4 Degradation of Threshold Cryptography
MOCA nodes are selected oﬀ-line and are not resurrected or re-elected during operation. It is
possible to elect nodes to become MOCA nodes on-line during operation of the network but it may
lead to a security breach. If the system supports online election of CA nodes and an adversary
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successfully acquires k identities, that adversary can be elected to be the CA node k times, eﬀectively
recovering the CA’s secret key. Therefore, MOCA chooses not to support any replenishing of CA
nodes but degrades gradually until less than k CA nodes are alive. At this point, the oﬀ-line
key dealer intervenes to reconﬁgure the framework, potentially suspending the normal network
operation for a short period.
Online secret share update has been proposed by Zhou to allow as many of the distributed CA
nodes as possible to be updated and remain secure and available for service for longer time [ZSvR].
However, the scheme is known to generate excessive communication overhead and heavy compu-
tational burden and also has never been applied to an ad hoc environment. We believe it is not
suitable for an ad hoc environment where both communication and computation uses scarce battery
power and other resources.
5.5 Communication Performance Evaluation
The focus of our performance evaluation is to measure the eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of MOCA
communication support. We show that the MOCA framework can maintain a secure distributed
CA without incurring prohibitive communication overhead to cripple normal network operations
by employing scoped-ﬂooding. The eﬀectiveness of the framework is measured by the success
ratio of certiﬁcation requests. Given a crypto threshold k, more than k replies from MOCA nodes
makes a certiﬁcation request successful. The success ratio must be kept at a high level under all
circumstances to provide useful service. However, a high success ratio should not come at the
price of excessive overhead that can aﬀect normal network operation. Overhead is measured by
the number of messages transmitted per certiﬁcation request. The simulation results show that
scoped-ﬂooding achieves a very high success ratio comparable to pure ﬂooding with an acceptable
packet overhead.
5.5.1 Simulation Set-Up
We implement our certiﬁcation protocols in the ns-2 network simulator [ns2]. 150 mobile nodes
are set up within either 1km by 1km area or 2km by 2km area. Out of 150 nodes, 30 nodes are
randomly selected as MOCA nodes. 30 MOCA nodes represent 20% of the total nodes, which we
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believe provide a reasonable number of MOCA nodes to support the given ad hoc network. Each
simulation is run for 600 seconds. Detailed simulation parameters are listed in Table 5.5.1. The
certiﬁcation request pattern includes 100 non-MOCA nodes, each making 10 certiﬁcation requests
randomly distributed through the simulation timeline, for a total of 1000 certiﬁcation requests.
Each requesting node makes one request per minute on average during the course of the simulation.
This is roughly 100 requests per minute and we believe that this is a reasonable number if not too
stressful to the framework. Assuming each certiﬁcation request precedes initiation of a new secure
communication, starting one secure communication session per node per minute should be more
than adequate for ordinary mobile nodes. Node movement follows the random waypoint mobility
model implemented by Yoon et al. [YLN03]. Data points in the graphs are averaged over ﬁve
diﬀerent mobility scenarios with identical simulation parameters. We measure the performance of
scoped-ﬂooding with pure ﬂooding as the baseline since they are the only anonymous manycast
routing protocols available. Pure ﬂooding always ﬂoods the network with certiﬁcation requests,
potentially incurring high overhead. In comparison, scoped-ﬂooding uses a limited ﬂooding of
certiﬁcation requests with a reduced TTL value when there is enough cached information. Scoped-
ﬂooding only falls back to pure ﬂooding when there is not enough information in the hopcount
cache. For all simulations, we control two parameters that aﬀect the performance of the MOCA
framework: the crypto threshold k and the mobility of nodes as measured in maximum speed.
• Crypto Threshold k - k is the minimum number of CREPs required for a client to reconstruct
the MOCA’s full signature and render the certiﬁcation request successful. If k is set to a small
number, a client only needs to collect a small number of k partial signatures to continue.
Therefore, with a small k, the success ratio increases and the packet overhead decreases. A
large k value makes attacks more diﬃcult, but the burden on clients and the packet overhead
increase since a client needs to contact a large number of MOCA nodes for a certiﬁcation
request.
• Mobility (Maximum Speed) - As nodes move faster, it becomes harder to maintain connec-
tivity to enough MOCA nodes. When scoped-ﬂooding is used, the client relies on its previous
knowledge about the number of nearby MOCA nodes. Under high mobility, this knowledge
remains valid only for a short period and scoped ﬂooding fails more frequently, resulting in
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Figure 5.5: Success Ratio in the 1000m x 1000m Scenario
decreased success ratio.
Our simulation results show consistent patterns throughout diﬀerent pause times, speed patterns
and number of MOCA nodes. Therefore in this section, we only present the results for varying k
with a ﬁxed maximum speed of 20 m/s and varying maximum speed with a ﬁxed k = 15.
Total Number of Mobile Nodes 150
Number of MOCA nodes 30
Area of Network 1000m x 1000m, 2000m x 2000m
Total Simulation Time 600 sec.
Number of Certiﬁcation Requests 10 requests each from 100 non-MOCA nodes
Node Pause Time 0, 10 sec.
Maximum Node Speed 0, 1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 50 m/s
Crypto Threshold k 1, 2, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30
Table 5.1: Simulation Parameters
5.5.2 Success Ratio
Success ratio for pure ﬂooding stays higher than 98% under all crypto threshold values in the
1km by 1km scenario, showing the eﬀectiveness of ﬂooding as a manycast communication protocol
(Figure 5.5 (a)). Scoped-ﬂooding also maintains a high success ratio between 96% and 99%. The
success ratio for scoped ﬂooding is at its lowest with k = 15 when many scoped-ﬂooding attempts
fail because of the stale information in the hopcount cache. Success ratio again increases as k grows
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Figure 5.6: Success Ratio in the 2000m x 2000m Scenario
larger than 15 because there is not enough information cached at the client and the client falls back
to pure ﬂooding. A similar pattern is ampliﬁed in Figure 5.6 (a) since the larger area and the lower
node density aﬀect the success ratio adversely.
Both ﬂooding and scoped-ﬂooding are not aﬀected by the mobility until the maximum node
speed reaches 20 m/s. With mobile nodes traveling faster than 20 m/s, the success ratio of scoped-
ﬂooding degrades down to 52% under an extreme maximum speed of 50 m/s (Figure 5.5 (b)). This
shows the eﬀect of having stale information in the client’s cache due to high mobility, which results
in more failed scoped-ﬂooding attempts. Figure 5.6 (b) shows a similar pattern in the 2km by 2km
scenario.
The eﬀectiveness of the MOCA framework is demonstrated with these results. MOCA is capable
of providing almost perfect availability under reasonable network conditions and the performance
gradually degrades as the network condition becomes pathological.
5.5.3 Packet Overhead
To measure the packet overhead for the MOCA framework, we measure the number of total packets
transmitted per request. When a packet is broadcast, it is counted once per hop. Unicast packets
are counted at each hop. While the number of packets per request simply measures the amount of
packet overhead, the number of packets per satisﬁed request shows the eﬀect of the success ratio.
In Figure 5.7 (a), both ﬂooding and scoped ﬂooding show little diﬀerence under all k values
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in the 1km by 1km scenario. For both cases, the number of packets per satisﬁed request is a
little higher than the number of packets per all requests since only a small portion of certiﬁcation
requests fail. However, Figure 5.8 (a) shows the power of scoped ﬂooding in a larger area. The
packet overhead of scoped-ﬂooding is less than half of pure ﬂooding in the lower k range. This shows
the eﬀect of localizing manycast transactions by scoped-ﬂooding, which improves the scalability of
the overall framework. As scoped ﬂooding fails more often with k larger than 15, the overhead
catches up to pure ﬂooding.
While ﬂooding shows a similar result under varying mobility in Figure 5.7 (b), the number of
packets per satisﬁed request for scoped-ﬂooding increases to higher than 500 packets per satisﬁed
request. This shows the limitation of scoped-ﬂooding to cope with very high mobility. Figure 5.8
(b) displays a similar pattern in a larger area. Again, scoped-ﬂooding performs better in the lower
mobility range but the overhead per satisﬁed request grows very quickly as mobility increases.
These results show that MOCA’s scoped-ﬂooding can eﬀectively suppress the packet overhead
by limiting the certiﬁcation traﬃc to local regions. In small scale scenarios with 1km x 1km area,
scoped-ﬂooding incurs a little lower overhead than pure ﬂooding. However, as the network size
grows, scoped-ﬂooding successfully suppress the overhead explosion from pure ﬂooding. Scoped-
ﬂooding is a highly eﬃcient and scalable approach to provide manycast communication support.
5.6 Summary of Contributions
In this chapter, we present MOCA, a practical key management framework for ad hoc wireless
networks. We clarify the necessity and the challenge of providing a PKI framework for ad hoc
networks and identify the requirements for such a framework. Based on our observation of the
potential heterogeneity among mobile nodes, we provide an intelligent way to pick a set of CA
nodes. These selected secure nodes are called MOCA nodes and share the responsibility of collec-
tively providing the CA functionality for an ad hoc network without revealing their identity. To
achieve both strong security and high availability of the MOCA framework, we provide insight into
the secure conﬁguration of threshold cryptography and the observation of a novel communication
pattern named manycast. To minimize the usage of scarce resources in mobile nodes, we develop a
set of eﬃcient and eﬀective manycast communication protocols for mobile nodes to correspond with
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the MOCA framework. Our security analysis shows that the MOCA framework can be conﬁgured
to defend against capable attackers and our simulation results show the eﬀectiveness of manycast
communication support. As shown in Figure 5.9, the MOCA framework can be placed very high
on the QoA axis and covers a range between medium to high availability for success ratio axis
compared to other existing approaches. In the next chapter, we present a novel approach for ad
hoc key management that improves MOCA’s availability challenge.
Replicated Full CA Nodes
QoA
Success Ratio
MOCA
Ideal
Point
Kong
Single CA Node
Figure 5.9: Comparison between MOCA and Existing Ad Hoc PKIs
While the MOCA framework’s performance in QoA is very close to the ideal point, there is
much to be improved on the success ratio. The wide range of success ratio achieved by the MOCA
framework means that there can be situations when the MOCA framework is unavailable for service.
In the next chapter, we present a novel Composite Key Management framework that addresses this
availability challenge without compromising the high QoA of the MOCA framework.
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Chapter 6
Composite Key Management
In the previous chapter, we presented the MOCA distributed PKI for ad hoc environments. MOCA
provides high quality authentication service based on an intelligent use of threshold cryptography
and anonymous Manycast routing support. Only shortcomings of the MOCA framework is that it
may not be always available for service under rapidly changing network conditions, which aﬀects
the overall quality of authentication service the MOCA framework can provide.
In comparison, certiﬁcate chaining uses a very diﬀerent approach to key management. Due to
its decentralized nature, certiﬁcate chaining can provide excellent availability. But the quality of
the provided authentication is not very high due to its dependence on the voluntary actions of
ordinary mobile nodes. Certiﬁcate chaining ﬁts naturally with ad hoc networks where there is no
physical infrastructure, relying on each mobile node to issue certiﬁcates to other nodes at their
own discretion. Certiﬁcate chaining requires a warm-up period to populate the certiﬁcation graph,
which completely depends on the individual node’s behavior and mobility. Additionally, there are
no guarantees that the resulting certiﬁcation graph will be dense enough to be useful. Finally, the
validity of a certiﬁcate chain depends on the trustworthiness of all the mobile nodes in the chain,
which may not be easy to ensure in open networks. This dependence on potentially unknown nodes
and the lack of any trust anchor in the system make certiﬁcate chaining unsuitable for situations
requiring strong security guarantees.
While both MOCA PKI and certiﬁcate chaining have diﬀerent advantages and limitations,
neither approach is eﬀective in all scenarios. To address their limitations in context, we deﬁne two
underlying principles for providing secure key management in ad hoc networks. First, the burden
of key management should be distributed to all nodes. Essentially, the more nodes participating
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in key management, the more available the framework. However, it is important to distribute key
management functionality in a way that maintains a high level of security. Second, it is highly
beneﬁcial to provide a trusted third party as a trust anchor for the network. Without a trust
anchor, the quality of authentication cannot exceed a certain level. The presence of a trusted third
party can signiﬁcantly increase the quality of authentication.
To take advantages of the beneﬁts of both techniques and satisfy these principles, we propose
Composite Key Management, which simultaneously deploys multiple key management mechanisms,
including distributed CAs and certiﬁcate chaining. By combining the characteristics of both of these
mechanisms, Composite Key Management can provide high quality authentications with a high level
of security and almost ubiquitous availability. A Composite Key Management framework can also
adapt to dynamic changes in the availability of key management services. For example, Composite
Key Management can provide excellent service in a network that supports both a distributed CA
and certiﬁcate chaining. However, if one of the services is not available to a node, the node can
still use the remaining services to receive the best possible authentication service. Essentially, users
have a full spectrum of choices in how to participate in and use the service.
To complete our framework, we present an authentication metric to determine the trust level
of the authentication and evaluate it as compared to pure distributed CA or pure certiﬁcate chain-
ing frameworks. These evaluations demonstrate that Composite Key Management can be used
to augment both distributed CAs and certiﬁcate chaining, improving both the success ratio for
authentication and the level of conﬁdence in the authentication.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The detailed design of the Composite Key Man-
agement frameworks is described in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 presents the evaluations of Composite
Key Management with comparisons to existing approaches. Finally, we summarize the contribu-
tions in Section 6.4.
6.1 Composite Key Management
It is apparent that an eﬀective key management framework for ad hoc networks must include a
secure TTP but still encourage participation from as many nodes as possible. To address both
of these principles, we propose a novel paradigm for ad hoc key management called Composite
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Key Management, which uses a distributed CA and certiﬁcate chaining simultaneously in a single
ad hoc network. The distributed CA in Composite Key Management follows the design decisions
from the MOCA distributed PKI and uses only a small subset of more trustworthy and secure
nodes for the distributed CA. With this design, Composite Key Management can provide a TTP
with strong security, satisfying the use of a TTP principle and the security component of the node
participation principle. At the same time, the rest of the nodes participate in certiﬁcate chaining
along with the distributed CA nodes to satisfy the availability component of the node participation
principle, improving the availability and the coverage of the distributed CA to a level of ubiquitous
presence. This combination of mechanisms can also improve the quality of authentication over
pure certiﬁcate chaining since a certiﬁcate chain-based authentication can now rely on the TTP
as a trust anchor, making the authentication inherently more trustworthy. It is important to note
that while Composite Key Management improves availability over a pure distributed CA approach,
the quality of the authentications that include certiﬁcate chains are lower than those only using a
distributed CA. However, this reduced quality of authentication only applies to the requests that
would have failed completely without Composite Key Management.
However, it is not simple to combine two heterogeneous approaches into a uniﬁed framework.
Essentially, the meaning of an authentication result becomes more complex since end users must
understand two diﬀerent types of mechanisms and reason about interactions between them. To solve
this problem, we utilize the concise set of authentication metrics from Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 that
encompass both distributed CAs and certiﬁcate chaining as well as the interactions between them.
With this metric, an end user can easily calculate a trust value for a given authentication request
to render decisions about whether or not to authenticate another node. Details of Composite Key
Management is presented in Section 6.2.
The situation diagram for Composite Key Management is essentially the combination of sit-
uation diagrams of a distributed PKI and certiﬁcate chaining since a composite framework com-
bines the two mechanisms.First two network properties, Secure Servers and Connectivity to Secure
Servers are from the PKI component and the other two network properties, Trustworthy Mobile
Nodes and Dense Certiﬁcation Graph are from the certiﬁcate chaining component. The environ-
mental factors that aﬀect each network property remains the same. It is shown in Figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.1: Situation for Composite Key Management
6.2 Design of Composite Key Management
The composition of a distributed CA and certiﬁcate chaining requires deploying the two frameworks
simultaneously and equipping the end users with the proper tools to use the composite framework.
The metrics of authentication presented in Section 4.2.2 allow end users to understand potentially
complicated authentication information provided by a Composite Key Management framework. We
can view the metric as the “glue” that binds all the components together. Since a distributed CA
and certiﬁcate chaining are both self-contained approaches, they can be deployed in any manner
possible: simultaneous deployment of both, adding a distributed CA to an existing certiﬁcate
chaining system, or adding certiﬁcate chaining to an existing distributed CA framework. To better
understand the interactions among the nodes in a composite framework, we ﬁrst describe the three
diﬀerent types of nodes and clearly deﬁne their roles. We then list some speciﬁc examples of
Composite Key Management.
6.2.1 Node Types in a Composite Key Management
In Composite Key Management, there are three types of nodes : CA nodes, nodes participating
in certiﬁcate chaining, and client nodes that use the key management service. A single node can
belong to more than one group.
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• CA Node: A CA node carries a share of the distributed CA’s private key and serves as
one of the multiple nodes that comprise the distributed CA. A CA node is equipped with
the capability to generate partial signatures using its key share, participate in certiﬁcate
revocation and maintain a list of certiﬁcates issued by the distributed CA. For a detailed
example of this type of node, we refer readers to previous works on distributed PKI in ad hoc
networks [KZL+01, YK03, ZH99].
• Participant in Certiﬁcate Chaining: A node participating in certiﬁcate chaining must be able
to authenticate its neighbors, create and issue certiﬁcates for neighbors, and maintain the set
of certiﬁcates it has issued. For a detailed example of this type of node, we refer readers to
Hubaux et al. [CBH03].
• A Client: Any client that makes authentication decisions must be able to understand certiﬁ-
cates from both the distributed CA and from certiﬁcate chaining. Therefore, all client nodes
must be equipped with the metric of authentication presented in the previous section. All
authentication information is mapped to a local certiﬁcation graph, which is used, along with
the metric of authentication, by the client to calculate a conﬁdence value for an authentication
instance and decide on the authentication of the target node. This type of decision process
allows individual nodes to apply their own criteria as to whether or not to authenticate on a
per authentication basis.
6.2.2 Composition Examples
Since Composite Key Management currently utilizes two types of techniques, it is useful to separate
the eﬀects of each technique on the other and study them in isolation. Therefore, we present example
compositions based on each technique. By gradually adding in the other technique, we can observe
the eﬀects separately. Since the composition examples use a distributed CA and certiﬁcate chaining,
there are two base certiﬁcation graphs that need to be composed. Figure 6.5 (a) represents the
certiﬁcation graph for the distributed CA component. All edges begin at the CA node and end at
the end user nodes. Additionally, all edges are solid, indicating that these edges represent CA-issued
certiﬁcates. Figure 6.6 represents the certiﬁcation graph for the certiﬁcate chaining component.
All edges are dashed arrows representing certiﬁcates are issued by peer nodes. These distinctions
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between the two types of edges are only for illustrative purposes and edges are not distinguished
in the actual application of the metric.
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Figure 6.4: Certiﬁcation Graph for Typical Composite Approach
The ﬁrst composition uses certiﬁcate chaining to enhance the coverage of a distributed CA.
The conﬁguration of the certiﬁcate chaining component determines the limit on chain lengths.
With 1-hop chaining, only nodes that have been certiﬁed by the distributed CA are allowed to
issue certiﬁcates to other nodes. In this conﬁguration, if a node wishes to acquire a certiﬁcate but
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Figure 6.5: Distributed CA composed with 1-hop Certiﬁcate Chaining
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Figure 6.6: Certiﬁcate Chaining composed with CA-certiﬁed Nodes
cannot reach the distributed CA, the node can search its neighborhood to ﬁnd any node that has
been certiﬁed by the distributed CA. The original distributed CA certiﬁcation graph in Figure 6.5
(a) is augmented with several 1-hop chains to form the graph in Figure 6.5 (b). Nodes with incoming
dashed edges, like K11 and K12, are certiﬁed by CA-certiﬁed nodes, but not by the CA. In the
original distributed CA certiﬁcation graph, the average conﬁdence value for all nodes is 0.843. In
the composed graph, while the extended coverage of the composite framework covers six more nodes
(K11, K12, K13, K14, K15, K18), the average conﬁdence value decreases to 0.657 (with p = 0.1
for attenuation) due to the lower conﬁdence values of the newly added certiﬁcate chains.
The second composition begins with a pure certiﬁcate chaining component. A TTP is introduced
by allowing CA-certiﬁed nodes to participate in certiﬁcate chaining. By design, a node certiﬁed by
a CA is more trusted and can be used to create new chains with higher levels of assurance. The
certiﬁcation graph of the pure certiﬁcate chaining component in Figure 6.6 (a) can be augmented
with certiﬁcations from a distributed CA as shown in Figure 6.6 (b). In the original certiﬁcation
graph in Figure 6.6 (a), there are three SCCs and nodes can authenticate each other only within an
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SCC. For example, K7 cannot authenticate K3 because there is no certiﬁcate chain from K7 to K3.
However, in the composed certiﬁcation graph in Figure 6.6 (b), K5 and K8 are certiﬁed by the CA
and therefore trusted. K7 in the composed system can authenticate K3 by following a chain from
(K5→K4→K3). The conﬁdence values of certiﬁcate chains also increase due to the distributed CA.
For example, the conﬁdence value that K2 has for K5 is 0.7 ∗ 0.9 ∗ (1− 0.1)1 = 0.567 (with p = 0.1
for attenuation) in the original certiﬁcation graph using the chain (K2→K3→K5). In the composed
graph, the authentication has an increased conﬁdence value of 0.95 following a direct chain from
the CA (CA→K5). Such composition is simple and cost-eﬀective and can enhance any certiﬁcate
chaining system. We are currently studying the eﬀect of this conﬁguration on real-world certiﬁcate
chaining systems like PGP [Zim95].
6.3 Evaluation
We demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of Composite Key Management through two sets of experiments.
We simulate stressful but realistic scenarios for a distributed CA or for certiﬁcate chaining and
the eﬀect of introducing Composite Key Management. We ﬁrst generate a set of relatively sparse
certiﬁcation graphs using pure certiﬁcate chaining. Since certiﬁcate chaining cannot provide an
adequate authentication service with these sparse graphs, we certify some fraction of the nodes in
the network using a distributed CA. These CA-certiﬁed nodes produce more certiﬁcate chains in
the graph, improving the overall success ratio. Also, the certiﬁed nodes enable discovery of shorter
and more trustworthy chains due to using the distributed CA as a trust anchor, improving the
overall quality of authentication. When measuring the quality of authentication, we present the
results from using a single chain with the highest QoA value through this chapter. Since the goal of
the evaluation in this chapter is to show the beneﬁt of composition over any existing mechanisms,
it is best to consider each authentication instances (i.e., a certiﬁcate chain) separately. In the next
chapter, we extend this metric to include all available certiﬁcate chains for complete comparison
study.
86
Number of Total Nodes 150
Number of MOCA nodes 30
Crypto Threshold k 1, 2, 5, 10, 15, 25, 30
Network Area 1000m x 1000m
Simulations Time 600 seconds
Certiﬁcate Request Pattern 10 requests from 100 client nodes
(Total 1000 requests)
Mobility Max speed of 20m/s,
10 sec pause time
Table 6.1: Simulation Parameters for ns-2
6.3.1 Composing a Distributed CA with Certiﬁcate Chaining
By composing the distributed CA with certiﬁcate chaining, composite key management increases
the availability and maintains strong security of the distributed CA. While Composite Key Manage-
ment can be applied to any kind of distributed CA scheme, we choose our own MOCA distributed
CA for this experiment. While MOCA adheres to the security component of the node participation
principle, it has been shown that MOCA cannot achieve a 100% success ratio under stressful situa-
tions due to mobility and intermittent connectivity. In this experiment, 1-hop certiﬁcate chaining is
used to augment the MOCA framework. Any node that has been certiﬁed by the MOCA framework
can issue certiﬁcates to other nodes.
In our simulation set-up, out of 150 total nodes, 30 nodes are selected to serve as the MOCA
nodes. To stress the MOCA distributed CA, we conducted two diﬀerent types of simulations. We
ﬁrst evaluate the eﬀect of mobility on the availability. Second, we evaluate the eﬀect of the crypto
threshold k by ﬁxing the number of MOCA nodes in the network and increasing k. Crypto threshold
is a common parameter to any distributed security service relying on a quorum of nodes to reach a
decision. In this case, k is the minimum number of MOCA nodes a client must contact to receive
certiﬁcation service. In all simulations, when a node requests a certiﬁcation service, the node ﬁrst
tries to contact the distributed CA. If that fails, the node probes its 1-hop neighborhood to check
if there are any CA-certiﬁed nodes. All simulation results are an average of ﬁve diﬀerent scenarios
with the same parameters in diﬀerent topologies. Simulation parameters are shown in Table 6.1.
To evaluate the eﬀect of composing MOCA with 1-hop certiﬁcate chaining on the success ratio,
we ﬁxed the crypto threshold k to 15 and gradually increased mobility. As shown in Figure 6.7,
the success ratio of MOCA degrades from 92% to 78% as mobility increases. However, the 1-
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Figure 6.7: Success Ratio vs. Mobility, k = 15
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Figure 6.8: Success Ratio vs. Crypto Threshold k, max speed = 20 m/s
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Max Speed (m/s) 1 5 10 20
MOCA Packet Overhead (pkts) 9234 130423 170375 190241
Chaining Packet Overhead (pkts) 189 256 332 503
Overhead Increase (%) 2 0.1 0.3 0.2
Table 6.2: Communication Overhead for Composite Approach, k=15
hop certiﬁcate chaining always succeeds in ﬁlling the gap and improving the success ratio to stay
between 99.2% and 100%. Similarly, Figure 6.8 shows results from varying the crypto threshold k
with a ﬁxed maximum speed of 20m/s. When k = 1, a client only needs to contact one MOCA
node and the success ratio is 99%. However, as k increases, a client node must contact more MOCA
nodes and the success ratio decreases. In the extreme case of k = 30, the success ratio drops to
52%. When 1-hop chaining is added, a 99-100% success ratio is achieved. As shown from these two
evaluations, even the simplest form of certiﬁcate chaining can alleviate the availability problems of
a distributed CA.
The average conﬁdence value for these experiments is aﬀected by the number of MOCA authen-
tications and the number of authentications using 1-hop chains. It is important to note that in both
of these experiments, the average conﬁdence value is reduced when composite key management is
used. However, this decrease is the result of including the lower conﬁdence values of the authenti-
cations using 1-hop chains and these authentications would not have been successful with MOCA
alone. Additionally, the successful authentications from MOCA retain their conﬁdence values with
composite key management. Essentially, more nodes are authenticated but with lower conﬁdence
values.
The beneﬁts of 1-hop certiﬁcate chaining comes with negligible overhead. Both communication
and computation overhead have been observed to be negligible since chaining is only invoked when
MOCA authentication has failed. Communication overhead is localized to 1-hop neighbors and each
certiﬁcate request consists of a single broadcast request packet and one or more reply packets. The
packet overhead from a simulation with ﬁxed k = 15 and varying mobility is shown in Table 6.2.
Results from varying simulation parameters show similar trends. Packet overhead stays under 2%
of the MOCA overhead in all cases.
This composite approach satisﬁes both principles without sacriﬁcing security or availability.
This demonstrates that limiting the core security functionality of the CA to a small fraction of
89
trusted nodes can maintain high security and availability at the same time by using the remaining
nodes to provide extended coverage of the distributed CA.
6.3.2 Composing Certiﬁcate Chaining with a TTP
The fundamental problems with certiﬁcate chaining stem from the fact that the certiﬁcation graph
is generated by the voluntary actions of individual nodes. When not enough nodes have issued
certiﬁcates, the certiﬁcation graph is too sparse to contain any chains between a given pair of
nodes. Even when the certiﬁcation graph becomes dense enough to provide certiﬁcate chains, the
validity of such chains remains questionable due to the dependence on the correct behavior of the
participating nodes. We evaluated the eﬀect of composing certiﬁcate chaining with a TTP using
several realistic scenarios that stress this limitation.
Since the composite approach is aimed at ad hoc environments, we generated certiﬁcation graphs
using a popular ad hoc mobility pattern generator set-dest with corrections for the speed-decay
problem [YLN03]. All mobility patterns include 100 nodes moving in 5000m by 5000m area for 600
seconds in simulation time. When any two nodes stay in each other’s transmission range for longer
than one minute, we assume that these two nodes always issue certiﬁcates to each other. A one
minute threshold is chosen to give nodes enough time to check each other’s identity as well as to
create and issue certiﬁcates. Such certiﬁcation graphs are as dense as possible for the given mobility
patterns. To simplify the evaluation, every certiﬁcate is issued with a maximum conﬁdence value
of 1.0. These two choices allow pure chaining to achieve the best possible performance, setting
the baseline as high as possible for fair demonstration of improvements from composition. The
injection of CA-certiﬁed nodes into the certiﬁcation graph is achieved through random sampling.
Nodes are randomly labeled as CA-certiﬁed up to the target fraction of CA-certiﬁed nodes. Since
the simulation area is relatively large compared to the number of deployed nodes, the density is
not very high, resulting in sparse certiﬁcation graphs. We study the eﬀect of varying the fraction
of certiﬁed nodes and the maximum speed. Pause time in all patterns is ﬁxed to 60 seconds.
Any variation of certiﬁcate chaining can be used for composition. However, the results from
our experiment represent the best achievable results for any certiﬁcate chaining approach since
all nodes are provided with complete knowledge of the full certiﬁcation graph. For example, an
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approach like Capkun et al. [CBH03] divides up the certiﬁcation graph across multiple nodes. It is
highly likely that a subset of mobile nodes can only recreate a part of the certiﬁcation graph. In
such cases, the resulting certiﬁcation graph will be sparser than the full graph and the performance
of pure chaining will degrade.
To evaluate composing certiﬁcate chaining with a TTP, we consider two metrics: the number
of successful authentications and the quality of authentication. For the quality metric, we measure
the average conﬁdence value from all chains resulting in successful authentications.
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Figure 6.9: Success Ratio vs. Fraction of Certiﬁed Nodes
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Figure 6.10: Average Conﬁdence Value vs. Fraction of Certiﬁed Nodes
In the ﬁrst set of experiments, the fraction of certiﬁed nodes is increased from 0% to 100%
with the maximum speed ﬁxed at 10m/s. With no certiﬁed nodes in the network, only 44% of all
possible pairs of nodes can authenticate each other in pure certiﬁcate chaining (See Figure 6.9).
As the fraction of certiﬁed nodes increases, the number of successful authentications for the com-
posite approach increases signiﬁcantly and reaches a 100% success ratio when every node in the
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Figure 6.11: Path Lengths, with varying fraction of certiﬁed nodes
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Figure 6.12: Success Ratio vs. Mobility, with 30% of certiﬁed nodes
network is certiﬁed. With 10% of the nodes certiﬁed, the composite approach provides 11% more
authentications, while with all nodes certiﬁed, the improvement goes up to 128%.
Figure 6.10 presents the average conﬁdence values from all certiﬁcate chains used for successful
authentications. As clearly displayed in Figure 6.10, the average conﬁdence value in the composite
framework is 66% to 570% higher than in pure certiﬁcate chaining. This is due to fact that with
many certiﬁed nodes in the network, the length of the certiﬁcate chains decreases, resulting in
higher conﬁdence values.
Figures 6.12 and 6.13 present similar results for varying mobility. As the maximum speed
increases from 0 m/s to 25 m/s, the success ratio of pure certiﬁcate chaining improves from 0.8%
to 94%. As nodes move faster, they travel farther and have a higher chance to meet more nodes,
resulting in a denser certiﬁcation graph. The success ratio of the composite approach also increases
for the same reason. However, in this experiment, Figure 6.13 is more interesting. While the average
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Figure 6.13: Average Conﬁdence Value vs. Mobility, with 30% of certiﬁed nodes
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Figure 6.14: Varying Limit on Chain Length, 30% certiﬁed nodes, 10 m/s max. speed
conﬁdence value of pure chaining stays within bounds, it gets worse in the composite approach.
Originally, the conﬁdence value from the composite approach is high since most authentications
rely on CA-certiﬁed nodes. However, a denser certiﬁcation graph through high mobility improves
the overall success ratio by creating more chains with lower conﬁdence values and these new chains
reduce the the average conﬁdence value.
Eﬀect of Limits on Chain Length Reiter and Stubblebine proposed to limit the maximum
allowable length of a certiﬁcate chain to avoid using questionable chains and increase the conﬁdence
of overall authentication [RS99]. To evaluate the eﬀect of this restriction, we vary the limits on
chain length. If a discovered chain is longer than the maximum allowable length, the chain is
simply discarded. As the length-limit increases, the success ratio increases for both pure certiﬁcate
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Figure 6.15: Varying Avg. Conﬁdence Value, 30% certiﬁed nodes, 10 m/s max. speed
chaining and the composite approach (See Figure 6.14 (a)). However, the composite approach
reaches a plateau sooner than pure certiﬁcate chaining. Pure chaining continues to increase until
the length limit is 10, while the composite approach reaches its maximum with length limit 5. This
indicates that the composite approach generates shorter chains than pure chaining and it is never
necessary to use a chain longer than 5 in this scenario. (The actual longest chain in the composite
graph has 6 hops but there are only two of them so the eﬀect of omitting them was minimal).
As shown in Figure 6.14 (b), the average conﬁdence values of pure chaining do not change very
much. However, with the composite approach, the average conﬁdence values keep decreasing as
more longer chains are introduced. This again shows the negative eﬀect of using long chains for
authentication purposes.
Eﬀect of Average Certiﬁcate Conﬁdence Value Finally, Figure 6.15 shows the eﬀect of
heterogeneous conﬁdence values for individual certiﬁcates on the overall quality of authentication.
As the average conﬁdence value for individual certiﬁcates grows from 0.1 to 1.0, the average chain
conﬁdence values for both pure chaining and the composite approach increase. However, as shown
in Figure 6.15 (b), the improvement from the composite approach is greater when individual cer-
tiﬁcate conﬁdence levels are low. For example, with average of 0.1 for certiﬁcate conﬁdence value,
the composite approach provides certiﬁcate chains achieving 1328% higher conﬁdence values. As
individual certiﬁcate conﬁdence values grow, the improvement slows down to 43% when every cer-
94
tiﬁcate in the network has a maximum conﬁdence value. This shows that the composite approach
can improve existing approaches even more under stressful situations.
6.4 Summary of Contributions
In this chapter, we propose a novel approach for key management in ad hoc network called Com-
posite Key Management. Based on the two principles from Section 4.1.2, detailed mechanisms
to implement a Composite Key Management framework are presented. Using two representative
conﬁgurations of Composite Key Management, we demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of composition.
Through extensive simulation studies, we demonstrate that Composite Key Management satisﬁes
both principles for ad hoc key management and can provide ﬂexible, modular, and adaptive key
management services for ad hoc networks. Using the same summary diagram from the previous
chapter, we can clearly see that the Composite Key Management excels both in the quality of
authentication and availability in Figure 6.16.
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Figure 6.16: Performance Comparison of Composite Key Management
In the next chapter, we complete our study of situation-aware ad hoc key management with
an extensive comparison study of all existing ad hoc key management frameworks using our QoA
metric.
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Chapter 7
Quality of Authentication of Ad Hoc
Key Management Frameworks
In previous two chapters, we presented our solutions for ad hoc key management with novel met-
rics to measure the quality of authentication service they provide. In this chapter, we apply our
comprehensive QoA metric to existing ad hoc key management frameworks including our own to
provide a complete the study of situation-aware ad hoc key management.
Most previous research on ad hoc key management frameworks has been evaluated with two
metrics: success ratio and overhead. While accurate overhead measurements can adequately ex-
press the cost of using the given key management framework, success ratio alone does not correctly
show the impact of situational factors on the utility of the framework. We showed that there is
a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the quality of authentication between CA-based PKIs and certiﬁ-
cate chaining approaches in Chapter 6. Therefore, a key management framework’s utility must
be measured in both dimensions: QoA and success ratio. Therefore, we use our MoA to exten-
sively study the QoA of existing key management frameworks. While the focus of this study is the
measurement of QoA, we also measure the success ratio to provide a complete evaluation. Addi-
tionally, we introduce a normalized QoA metric that integrates QoA and success ratio, allowing
for a comprehensive evaluation of overall performance. First, we present the metrics of interest in
more detail. Second, we discuss how the experiments are set up to compare diﬀerent designs of key
management frameworks. Based on both analytical and simulated results, we evaluate existing key
management frameworks including two distributed PKI, one distributed certiﬁcate chaining, and
one hybrid approach.
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7.1 Evaluation Criteria
The main focus of this study is QoA measurement. However, measuring only QoA is no better
than measuring success ratio alone, as in most previous studies. Both QoA and success ratio must
be measured together for comprehensive evaluation of the utility of key management frameworks.
7.1.1 Quality of Authentication
Using the QoA metric presented in Section 4.2.2, the QoA Engines in the client nodes calculate
the QoA for a single authentication instance. To evaluate the quality of service provided by a key
management framework, we use the average QoA value over all successful authentication instances,
which separates out the eﬀect of unsuccessful authentications.
QoA(framework) =
∑
QoA(Authentication Instance)
No. of Successful Authentications
. (7.1)
In a distributed PKI approach, the QoA of the framework is simply the security level of the
distributed CA since all authentications are performed through the distributed CA. Therefore, the
QoA of a distributed PKI approach is calculated analytically based on the conﬁguration parameters
from Equation 4.1. In a certiﬁcate chaining approach, the QoA of each authentication depends on
the shape and contents of the local TRG of the authenticating node, which depends on the operating
conditions of the network. Therefore, the QoA of the framework can only be measured through
extensive simulation by calculating the QoA for all possible instances under varying conditions.
For hybrid approaches, both analytical measurements for the distributed PKI component and
simulation studies for the certiﬁcate chaining component must be measured and combined.
7.1.2 Success Ratio
Along with QoA, success ratio is another key metric to evaluate the utility of a key management
framework. Success Ratio is deﬁned as:
Success Ratio =
No. of Successful Authentication
No. of All Authentication Attempts
. (7.2)
In a distributed CA approach, a successful authentication is achieved when the authenticating
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node successfully contacts the distributed CA and receives a certiﬁcation service. In other words,
success ratio for a distributed CA is deﬁned by the the availability of the CA, which depends on
mobility, topology, and CA access patterns in the network. We use the ns-2 network simulator to
measure the success ratio of distributed PKI approaches under various scenarios.
For a certiﬁcate chaining approach, the success of authentication solely depends on the authen-
ticating node’s local knowledge about trust relationships in the network. In other words, the shape
and contents of the authenticating node’s local TRG determine the success of an authentication
attempt. The shape of a local TRG depends on two factors: the shape of the global TRG and the
TRG distribution mechanism. If the global TRG does not contain any chain linking the authenti-
cating node and the target node, authentication always fails. Even when there is a certiﬁcate chain
in the global TRG, an authentication can still fail if the local TRG of the authenticating node
does not contain the relevant chain. Therefore, success ratios for a distributed certiﬁcate chaining
approach measure the eﬀectiveness of the TRG distribution mechanism. We generate a suite of
global TRGs and their matching set of local TRGs from mobility patterns generated from the ns-2
network simulator.
In this way, it is possible to enforce the same type of mobility patterns and network conditions
on both distributed PKI and certiﬁcate chaining approaches. For a hybrid approach, a successful
authentication can be provided with either the distributed PKI or the certiﬁcate chaining compo-
nent. We showed that it is desirable to use distributed PKI when possible, then use the certiﬁcate
chaining as the back-up measure, to maintain a high quality of authentication in Chapter 6. Fol-
lowing this intuition, we designed our experiments to force the client nodes to ﬁrst try to use the
distributed PKI service and fall back to certiﬁcate chaining only when PKI cannot provide service.
7.1.3 Normalized QoA
For a more intuitive comparison, we can combine the QoA of a framework and the success ratio
into a single metric called Normalized QoA deﬁned as:
Normalized QoA = QoA ∗ Success Ratio. (7.3)
Normalized QoA can be understood as the average QoA of all authentication instances including
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both successful and unsuccessful. Since normalized QoA includes success ratio, it can only be
calculated for a set of past authentication results and not per authentication basis. However,
normalized QoA embodies the idea of situation-aware security by integrating all situational impacts
on authentication services and allows the network operators to understand the overall performance
in a comprehensive manner.
7.2 Experiment Set-Up
To evaluate and compare diﬀerent approaches, we use the ns-2 network simulator and its mobility
generator. The same set of simulation parameters, including the number of mobile nodes, the oper-
ating area of the network, the mobility patterns of nodes, the authentication request patterns, and
simulation time are enforced between diﬀerent approaches for fair comparison. In all simulations,
the test network contains 150 mobile nodes. Two diﬀerent simulation areas, of sizes 1500m x 500m
and 3000m x 3000m, are used. In all cases, the network runs for 500 seconds in simulation time
before measurement begins. This warm-up phase is to eliminate the eﬀects of a network cold start
and also to give enough time for certiﬁcate chaining to “boot up” so that TRGs can reach a stable
state. The rest of the simulation parameters are listed in Table 7.1.
Total Number of Mobile Nodes 150
Area of Network 1500m x 500m, 3000m x 3000m
Total Simulation Time 1000 seconds (including 500 sec. warm-up time)
Node Pause Time 10 sec.
Maximum Node Speed 0, 1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 50 m/s
Table 7.1: Simulation Parameters
7.3 Experiments
7.3.1 Distributed PKI Approaches
Since all successful authentications in a PKI approach are through the certiﬁcate authority and no
other nodes, measurement the QoA of distributed PKI approaches can be acquired by the analytical
calculation of the CA security level as presented in Section 4.2.2. The QoA Engine in a client node
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can calculate a distributed CA’s security level based on its threshold cryptography conﬁguration.
Since the CCV for a CA-based authentication instance relies solely on the security level of the CA
for the conﬁdence value as deﬁned in Equation 4.3, the average QoA for a distributed PKI approach
is the average of the CA’s security level observed by all end users in the system. In our simulation
study, we assume that all end users share the same perception of the network status and have a
single c value. The CA’s security level presented in Equation 4.1 for the experimental settings
behaves as in Figure 6.2.2, which is based on the calculation with the example crypto threshold k
= 10. Given a ﬁxed k, varying c or more speciﬁcally varying the gap between k and c aﬀects the
CA’s security level.
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Figure 7.1: CA Security Level
In Figure 6.2.2, each curve shows diﬀerent conﬁgurations of a distributed PKI approach with
varying number of CA nodes. There are two important properties to note. First, each curve has a
sharp drop point where the CA’s security level drops from a very high value close to 1.0 to a very low
value close to 0.0. This means that the security of a distributed CA based on threshold cryptography
does not degrade gracefully as attackers become more capable, emphasizing the importance of
picking the right number of CA nodes depending on the operating conditions. Second, the curves
move to the left as the number of CA nodes increases, showing that it is important to limit the
number of CA nodes to a small fraction. The leftmost line shows the case for Kong’s approach (i.e.,
n = 150) where the security level drops from 1.0 to 0.0 as soon as the attacker becomes capable of
compromising k nodes.
100
Kong et al.’s Distributed CA
The success ratios for distributed PKI approaches are measured with ns-2 network simulations
where the authenticating nodes try to contact the distributed CA when they need to authenticate
another node. Since testing all possible instances of authentication in 150-node networks requires
excessive amounts of time to simulate (22,500 certiﬁcation requests must be served), we use a
random sampling to reduce the amount of simulations to be performed. More speciﬁcally, 100 nodes
are randomly selected and they each choose 50 other random nodes and attempt to authenticate
each of them in turn. This test covers 5,000 authentication instances (around 22% of all cases). We
run ﬁve diﬀerent mobility scenarios for each set of simulation parameters and the results presented
here are the average from the ﬁve simulation runs. All results presented in this section are from
scenarios with attacker’s capacity c = 10 and crypto threshold k = 10. If c < k, the CA is
protected by the threshold cryptography. An adversary with a capacity c = k is the least powerful
attacker that can compromise the CA. We assume that there is one such least powerful attacker
in evaluation of Kong’s scheme because Kong’s scheme becomes completely vulnerable as long as
c ≥ k and increasing the attacker’s capacity beyond k (i.e., c > k) does not have any eﬀect on the
CA’s security level.
Kong’s distributed PKI uses all mobile nodes in the network as distributed CA nodes. Every
node shares a piece of the CA’s secret key and can participate in providing authentication service.
In our experiments, the total number of mobile nodes is ﬁxed to 150, as is the number of CA nodes,
by design. Various crypto threshold values, k = 1, 5, 10, 20, 30, have been tested. Intuitively, a
higher k value should decrease the success ratio and improve the security of the distributed CA.
However, this eﬀect is not seen in Kong’s design since (1) success ratio is always maintained very
high due to their design decisions to use all mobile nodes as CA nodes, and (2) the security level of
Kong’s CA is constantly low as long as the attacker’s capacity, c, exceeds the crypto threshold k.
Figures 7.2 (a) and (b) each show QoA, success ratio, and normalized QoA for 1500m x 500m
and 3000m x 3000m test area. Even though the test area in the second case is considerably larger,
resulting in a much lower node density, the success ratio of Kong’s distributed CA still remains
high. This is due to the high redundancy of CA nodes. However, the same design choice makes
it very easy to compromise the distributed CA as long as the attacker is powerful enough. The
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Figure 7.2: Kong’s Distributed PKI
attacker can always compromise Kong’s framework, which yields the CA security level close to zero,
resulting in very low QoA values. As a result, the normalized QoA is heavily aﬀected by the low
QoA and also remains very low. In summary, Kong’s approach is an example where the quality of
security is sacriﬁced to provide perfect availability. This design decision is captured by applying
the situational information and can now be exposed to end users.
MOCA
We presented the MOCA distributed PKI in Chapter 5. They enhance the security of the dis-
tributed CA by limiting the number of CA nodes to a relatively small fraction while hiding their
identities so that attackers cannot focus their attack resources on the CA nodes. Also, the CA
nodes in MOCA are selected based on their node characteristics so that they can resist potential
attacks. In our experiments, we tested with varying numbers of CAs, between 15 and 50, which
are respectively 10% and 33% of the total mobile nodes. In this section, we present a case with
n = 30 where 20% of the mobile nodes in the network are selected as distributed CA nodes. Results
presented here use the ﬁxed values of crypto threshold k = 10, and the attacker’s capacity c = 10
for a fair comparison with Kong’s scheme. In MOCA, as the attacker grows stronger (i.e., with
larger c), the CA’s security level stays high much longer and then degrades gracefully compared to
Kong’s scheme.
In both Figures 7.3 (a) and (b), the security of the MOCA framework is maintained high, very
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Figure 7.3: MOCA Distributed PKI
close to 1.0. This shows the eﬀect of the design choices to enhance the security of the distributed
CA. However, the price for maintaining such a high level of security is shown in the success ratio
in both graphs. In Figure 7.3 (a), the success ratio gradually degrades from 92% to 45% as the
mobility in the network increases. While 45% success ratio under the extreme mobility of 50 m/s
does not seem too bad, the eﬀect on success ratio is more ampliﬁed in Figure 7.3 (b), where the
node density is considerably lower than Figure 7.3 (a), which causes more diﬃculty to contact the
required number of distributed CA nodes. The success ratio in Figure 7.3 (b) degrades from 85% to
17%. In the MOCA framework, the success ratio dominates the normalized QoA since it provides
a very high QoA constantly with varying success ratios. MOCA is an example where the authors
ﬁrst achieve very strong security of the framework and provide the best-achievable communication
support for the given availability, demonstrating the applicability of the Situation-Aware Security
paradigm for ad hoc security service design.
7.3.2 Certiﬁcate Chaining Approaches
Measurement of QoA for certiﬁcate chaining is based on the contents of the local TRG of authen-
ticating nodes at the time of the authentication attempt. If the authenticating node has more
information (or a larger portion of the global TRG), both QoA and the success ratio improve. The
success ratio of certiﬁcate chaining again depends on the snapshot of the local TRG of the authen-
ticating node at the time of the authentication attempt. Since the best achievable QoA and the
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success ratio of distributed certiﬁcate chaining are limited by the shape of the global TRG, we ﬁrst
simulate the ideal case where every mobile node has perfect knowledge of the trust relationships in
the network and compare the results with a distributed certiﬁcate chaining mechanism proposed
by Capkun et al. [CBH03].
To compare certiﬁcate chaining with distributed PKI approaches, we enforced the same mobility
patterns and network settings for both simulations. Based on the mobility log from each 1000-second
simulation run, we populate the global trust relationship graph by adding an edge (or issuing a
certiﬁcate) when a node is in communication range of another node for more than one minute.
This is to simulate the time to identify each other, collect relevant data from each other, and issue
certiﬁcates with a full conﬁdence value of 1.0 to each other. This results in best-case scenarios
for certiﬁcate chaining where every trust relationship is bidirectional (which is not always true
in reality) and has the maximum level of conﬁdence. In a way, we are creating the best-possible
scenarios for certiﬁcate chaining that generate the upper-bound for QoA and success ratio. We
show next that even with these strong assumptions, certiﬁcate chaining can only provide marginal
performance due to its inherent dependence on transitive trust. For the results in the graph, we
use γ = 0.3 for the impact factor when combining multiple chains.
Using the Global Trust Relationship Graph
The ﬁrst set of results for certiﬁcate chaining is from the ideal case where every mobile node has
perfect knowledge about the global TRG. After generating the global TRG during the 1000-second
simulation run, authentications between every pair of nodes is performed using the global TRG.
Both QoA and success ratio improve in Figures 7.4 (a) and (b) as mobility increases. This is
due to the increase number of nodes that a mobile node encounters as they move faster. With
30 second pause time, two mobile nodes that encounter each other issue certiﬁcates to each other
with a high probability, thus populating the TRG. Since a denser TRG contains more certiﬁcates
chains, both QoA and success ratio are improved. Unlike the cases with distributed PKI approaches
where either success ratio or QoA dominates the eﬀect on normalized QoA, the normalized QoA
of certiﬁcate chaining is aﬀected by both. Normalized QoA also improves as mobility grows due to
the improvement in both success ratio and QoA.
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Figure 7.4: Certiﬁcate Chaining with Global Trust Relationship Graph
Distributed Certiﬁcate Chaining by Capkun et al.
Capkun et al. proposed a distributed version of certiﬁcate chaining without having a centralized
component that stores the global TRG [CBH03]. Basically, each mobile node carries a subgraph
of the global TRG and nodes enhance their knowledge as they encounter more nodes. We use the
same method as in the global TRG test where each mobile node generates their local TRG during
the 1000-second simulations runs according to the scheme proposed in the paper. Then, each node
attempts to authenticate every other node in the network only using the local TRG. As shown in
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Figure 7.5: Distributed Certiﬁcate Chaining by Capkun et al.
Figure 7.5 (a), Capkun’s distributed version provides a comparable success ratio to using the global
TRG in all ranges as shown in their original paper. However, since each mobile node has less than
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Figure 7.6: Composite Key Management
perfect knowledge about the global TRG, many authentication instances based on the local TRG
use longer certiﬁcate chains, resulting in the lower overall QoA values. This eﬀect is even more
clearly ampliﬁed in Figure 7.5 (b) where the node density is much lower and the mobile nodes are
challenged to gather enough information about the global trust relationships. The success ratio in
Figure 7.5 (b) also shows the eﬀect of imperfect knowledge caused by the distribution of the TRG.
Normalized QoA shows this degradation of performance in an ampliﬁed view since the eﬀect
from imperfect knowledge is represented twice through both success ratio and QoA. These results
again emphasize the importance of situation-aware security where the quality of security is con-
stantly monitored since a naive comparison of success ratios alone does not clearly demonstrate the
diﬀerence between authentications based on global knowledge and partial knowledge.
7.3.3 Hybrid Approaches
We presented the performance of our Composite Key Management framework in Chapter 6 that
it can achieve both high success ratio and high QoA using the single chain CCV. In this section,
we present results from utilizing all available node-disjoint certiﬁcate chains. When there are two
mechanisms in place, an end user can choose freely from either one. However, in this experiment,
we force the mobile nodes to ﬁrst try the distributed PKI and then fall back to certiﬁcate chaining
when PKI cannot provide authentication service. This is following their original experiment where
the use of PKI is preferred due to its higher QoA support.
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As shown in Figure 7.6 (a), Composite Key Management achieves a very high success ratio
while maintaining a very high QoA. However, under more challenging scenarios in Figure 7.6 (b),
while success ratio is still maintained at relatively high levels, the quality of authentication starts
to degrade as the distributed CA becomes unavailable and mobile nodes become challenged to
maintain their local TRG. Normalized QoA for the ﬁrst set stays very close 1.0, showing almost
perfect quality of security. However, under more challenging conditions, normalized QoA drops
down to 0.45, showing that even this hybrid approach, which is speciﬁcally designed for ad hoc
environments, cannot always provide perfect security. This observation again emphasizes the need
for situation-awareness where the ﬂuctuations in the quality of provided security is constantly
monitored and conveyed to the end users.
7.4 Summary of Findings
QoA
Success Ratio
Distributed Certificate 
Chaining
MOCA
Kong
Certificate Chaining
Composite
Key 
Management
Ideal
Point
Figure 7.7: Performance Summary of Ad Hoc Key Management Frameworks
Figure 7.7 summarizes the various ad hoc key management frameworks evaluated in this study
using a two dimensional chart. In general, it is better to be close to the ideal performance point
represented as the black rectangle. Also, a smaller range, both in success ratio and QoA, means more
constant results, while a larger range represents more variance in the quality of the provided service.
It is clear that previous approaches that only evaluate success ratio are not enough to eﬀectively
compare diﬀerent designs. Success ratios from all examined frameworks overlap each other and it
is unclear how to compare their performance based on success ratio only. While Kong’s approach
stands out with the highest success ratio under all conditions, QoA measurements reveal the low
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QoA it provides. The performance of certiﬁcate chaining and distributed certiﬁcate chaining varies
over a large range of success ratios and QoA, which suggests that they might not be a good choice
for scenarios that require more predictable authentication services. MOCA provides constantly high
QoA with varying success ratio, which can be a good solution for environments where the quality
of authentication matters more than high availability of the authentication service. Composite Key
Management provides the best performance in both success ratio and QoA and the small coverage
area shows a more consistent level of service. However, even Composite Key Management cannot
provide perfect service under challenging conditions as shown in the previous section and this again
demonstrates the importance of the situation-aware security paradigm in ad hoc networks. Eﬀorts
to measure the changing quality of security under varying conditions and conveying the results to
end users in an intuitive manner must be parallel to the eﬀorts to designing better-suited security
services for ad hoc environments. Also, based on this comparison, network operators can choose
an appropriate key management framework to deploy according to their needs. QoA completes the
comprehensive evaluation of ad hoc key management frameworks and can be used as an eﬀective
guide for future designs.
7.5 Summary of Contributions
In this chapter, we extended the QoA metric presented in the previous chapter with consideration
for multiple certiﬁcate chains. Following Reiter and Stubblebine’s suggestion, we enforce the chains
to be node-disjoin from one another and combine the CCVs from each chain using a method based
on scientiﬁc conﬁrmation theory. Extensive comparison study using our QoA metric shows that
various key management frameworks provide drastically diﬀerent QoA, which suggests that any
eﬀective security service for ad hoc environments must be designed around the quality of the
provided service based on situational information.
The importance of situation-aware security in ad hoc authentication services is clearly demon-
strated in this chapter since none of existing key management framework designs are immune to the
environmental eﬀects from ad hoc environments. Even the Composite Key Management designed
speciﬁcally for the ad hoc environments does not provide perfect availability under challenging net-
work conditions. Therefore, it is imperative to augment ad hoc key management frameworks with
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situation-awareness component and convey the continuous QoA measurement back to end users
so that they can make well-informed decisions. There are also some inherently best-eﬀort security
services designed for wired networks, such as PGP, which can easily be augmented with support for
situation-awareness. We plan to investigate the applicability of situation-aware security to these
services and measure its impact.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
Security for ad hoc environments must be viewed and understood in a very diﬀerent manner due to
various and signiﬁcant challenges from the characteristics of ad hoc networks. Instead of focusing on
providing absolutely guaranteed security services as expected in traditional environments, security
in ad hoc networks must be treated as a best-eﬀort service whose quality can change frequently and
to a signiﬁcant extent. To understand these complicated interactions between ad hoc environments
and security services, we propose a concept of Situation that captures the assumptions an ad
hoc security service requires and the way such assumptions are aﬀected by environmental factors.
By incorporating these interactions into measuring the changing quality of security service, we
provide a more viable and practical approach to enable necessary security supports for ad hoc
networks, thus enabling its true potential as instantaneously deployable networks. Following this
paradigm, we presented two types of situation-aware security services: security-aware routing and
key management. Security-aware routing is a novel approach to quantify the quality of protection
for the data path and steer routing decisions based on the security of participating nodes. We
provide two designs of situation-aware key management frameworks: MOCA distributed PKI and
Composite Key Management. To complete the design, we also presented a comprehensive metric
to measure the quality of authentication provided by key management frameworks.
Situation-aware security paradigm can be and should be used to design other types of ad hoc
security services including secure routing, incentive systems and even positioning systems. Each
type of security service must be examined to discover the respective situations for each service and
metrics to measure the quality of security must be designed based on the situational knowledge.
One promising venue of research is to automate this process. Automated discovery of situational
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information of a security service and design of appropriate metrics could vastly accelerate the
adoption of the situation-aware security paradigm in research community.
There are other potential venues where the situation-aware paradigm may be applied. Any
decentralized, distributed system can be a good candidate including fast emerging peer-to-peer
systems. While a typical peer-to-peer system enjoys more luxuries such as stable connectivity
compared to ad hoc environments, the situation-aware paradigm can still help design more eﬃcient
and low-cost security mechanisms for peer-to-peer environments.
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